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“SLACK” IN THE DATA AGE 
Shu-Yi Oei* & Diane M. Ring**  
This Article examines how increasingly ubiquitous data and information affect the role of “slack” in the 
law. Slack is the informal latitude to break the law without sanction. Pockets of slack exist for various 
reasons, including information imperfections, enforcement resource constraints, deliberate nonenforcement 
of problematic laws, politics, biases, and luck. Slack is important in allowing flexibility and forbearance 
in the legal system, but it also risks enabling selective and uneven enforcement. Increasingly available data 
is now upending slack, causing it to contract and exacerbating the risks of unfair enforcement. 
 
This Article delineates the various contexts in which slack arises and presents a bounded defense of slack, 
despite its risks and notwithstanding the parallel existence of formal leniency provisions in the law. It 
explains how increasingly available data is reshaping slack and highlights the risk of disparate 
contraction of slack for different populations along lines of race, political power, and sophistication. 
Ultimately, this Article proposes a framework for managing the complex relationship between slack and 
data and suggests policy solutions to address data-driven contraction of slack while minimizing slack’s 
risks. These policy solutions include limits on data collection, construction of data silos, and fundamental 
rethinking of legal rules and the role of government. 
INTRODUCTION 
We live in an age of ubiquitous data.1 Large stashes of data are increasingly 
being collected, processed, and used for a wide range of purposes, including 
surveillance, marketing, development of algorithms, and fighting crime.2 In this 
Article, we focus on one important consequence of increasingly ubiquitous data 
for the legal system: how growing access to data and information has changed 
the availability and operation of “slack” in the law. 
“Slack” is informal latitude.3 While humans often break the law, 
noncompliance is not always punished in practice—there have long been 
informal pockets of leeway or slack in the system, instances in which someone 
may fall short of legal or regulatory compliance but not be sanctioned.4 Slack 
 
*   Professor of Law & Dean’s Distinguished Scholar, Boston College Law School. 
** Professor of Law & Dr. Thomas F. Carney Distinguished Scholar, Boston College Law School. 
We are grateful to the participants of the Cornell Law School Faculty Workshop, the University of South 
Carolina Law School Faculty Workshop, the Yale Law School Information Society Project Ideas Lunch 
Workshop, the Critical Tax Theory Workshop UC Irvine, Law & Society Conference 2021, and tax policy 
workshops at New York University, Northwestern, Duke, and University of Toronto law schools, for helpful 
feedback on drafts. 
1.  See The Privacy Project, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2019 to Dec. 19, 2019),  
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/opinion/internet-privacy-project.html (exploring technology, 
data, and privacy). The analytics field distinguishes data, information, and insights. We use the term “data” as 
a shorthand. 
2.  See Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934 (2013) (noting dangers of 
using data for surveillance); Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633 (2017) 
(discussing algorithmic accountability).  
3.  See Slack, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989). 
4.  See Woodrow Hartzog et al., Inefficiently Automated Law Enforcement, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1763, 
1780 (2015). 
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captures the phenomenon whereby violations of laws or regulations are let slide 
in ways not formally specified in advance. The concept refers to extra-legal 
spaces in which governments, regulators, and other enforcers exercise 
discretion in deciding not to notice, not to sanction, or to sanction less harshly 
than the law stipulates, whether driven by information imperfections, deliberate 
underenforcement, resource constraints, politics, bias, or luck.5 
Being informal latitude, slack exists on top of deliberately designed formal 
legal provisions that provide leniency and discretion (such as tiered penalties, 
broad standards, and other equitable features).6 Thus, there is an argument that 
these formal equitable provisions are sufficient, and that slack on top of them 
is unnecessary, not to mention problematic. This Article argues, to the contrary, 
that slack remains important over and above formal equitable and leniency 
provisions, and that it should be safeguarded in the face of increasingly available 
data. 
Most people intuitively understand that some slack in the system is 
desirable. For example, where a law is out of date or contains overly harsh 
penalties, slack in the sense of underenforcement can help prevent injustice. On 
the other hand, it is also widely recognized that some groups are routinely and 
systemically cut more slack than others.7 Thus, slack in the legal system is 
sometimes deeply problematic. This Article presents a framework for 
systematizing these intuitions and for understanding how data changes the 
operation and existence of slack. 
This Article undertakes three tasks. First, it delineates the varied contexts 
in which slack arises, identifies its major risks, and presents a bounded defense 
of the important role slack plays in the legal system, even on top of formal 
equitable features in the law. Despite its potential risks, slack acts as a constraint 
on too much law, protects against excessive government incursion into personal 
spaces, and provides a necessary second space for substantive debate given 
imperfections in our political and legislative process.8 Slack thus acts as a safety 
valve in the legal system. Second, this Article explains how increasingly 
ubiquitous data and information put pressure on slack and cause it to contract 
disparately for different populations, with unfair and increasingly serious 
distributive impacts. Finally, this Article proposes a framework for 
understanding and managing the relationship between slack and data, designed 
to prevent problematic data-driven contractions of slack while minimizing 
slack’s risks. It makes concrete policy recommendations, including limitations 
on data collection, construction of data silos, and ultimately, rethinking of the 
 
5.  See id. 
6.  In close cases, it may be hard to distinguish formal equity from informal slack. See discussion infra 
Part I.A. 
7.  See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 195 (1968). 
8.  See Christina M. Mulligan, Perfect Enforcement of Law: When to Limit and When to Use Technology, 14 RICH. 
J.L. & TECH. 36, 39–40, 44–45 (2008). 
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design of legal rules and sanctions and reconceptualization of the role of 
government in the data age. 
A simple initial hypothetical may help highlight the tensions with which this 
Article is concerned. Imagine that you steal a pumpkin off your neighbor’s 
porch. Will your larceny be punished? There are various scenarios under which 
it might not be, including if the authorities don’t catch you, if they see but ignore 
you, or if they catch you but let you off the hook. These scenarios may be a 
function of luck (for example, whether the police happened to drive by, or 
whether they were in a good mood and did not arrest you), deliberate policy 
(for example, the number of patrols assigned to your neighborhood), bias (for 
example, based on your race), or unspoken norms (for example, if pumpkin 
larceny is a well-tolerated neighborhood joke).9 
Now imagine a significant influx of data and information, for example, due 
to public or private security camera surveillance or facial recognition 
technologies.10 These technologies may change behavior and punishment in a 
number of ways. They obviously make catching you easier. They may also make 
it harder for law enforcement to ignore you, particularly if your theft is more 
visible to outside observers who may complain about nonenforcement. There 
may be collateral consequences: once you have become ensnared in the 
enforcement web, you are more likely to be sanctioned for other (past and 
subsequent) offenses.11 You yourself might stop stealing pumpkins if you think 
the chances of getting punished are higher.12 On the other hand, if the increased 
visibility is not salient to you, you might continue stealing pumpkins. 
This pumpkin hypothetical illustrates the complex ways in which slack 
arises, highlighting the role of information constraints, other resource 
constraints, selective enforcement, deliberate nonenforcement, biases, norms, 
and luck in creating and shaping slack. The hypothetical also shows how 
increased data and information might reshape slack and cause it to contract, 
and how both behaviors and enforcement choices may shift in response. 
Further reflection on this hypothetical may also yield other insights. First, 
how we view slack and the impact of data on slack surely depends on the law 
in question; serious crimes like murder or assault will likely provoke different 
reactions than minor offenses like purloining a pumpkin. One might also expect 
a range of different feelings about medical marijuana laws;13 laws prohibiting 
 
9.  See generally Becker, supra note 7 (arguing that the optimal amount of crime is not zero). 
10.  See, e.g., Cade Metz, Facial Recognition Tech is Growing Stronger, Thanks to Your Face, N.Y. TIMES (July 
13, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/13/technology/databases-faces-facial-recognition-
technology.html. 
11.  See, e.g., Sarah Brayne, Big Data Surveillance: The Case of Policing, 82 AM. SOCIO. REV. 977, 986–87, 
990–92 (2017) (noting that big data surveillance leads to predictive policing, more surveillance of those 
without previous police contact, and merging of previously separate data systems). 
12.  Becker, supra note 7 (positing rational criminal actors). 
13.  Michael Hartman, Cannabis Overview: Legalization, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (July 6, 
2021), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/marijuana-overview.aspx (summarizing laws 
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adultery, fornication,14 or sodomy;15 prohibitions against physician-assisted 
suicide;16 unjust laws; laws out of step with societal expectations; or areas of 
complex regulation such as banking or securities law.17 
Second, uncomfortable tensions and deeply problematic practices lurk 
within our seemingly benign pumpkin hypothetical. A longstanding practice of 
looking the other way when pumpkin theft occurs between neighbors in a well-
to-do neighborhood is likely to be a function of factors such as race, 
socioeconomic status, differential power, or other favored status.18 If this 
degree of slack is not enjoyed by other communities, slack’s contraction in these 
circumstances arguably might be viewed as positive. This ties to a third and 
broader point: our reaction to slack is expected to be context dependent, 
operating in relative rather than absolute terms. For example, if we observe that 
slack is shrinking disproportionately for certain populations (for example, 
communities of color) but not others given increasing data, we might be 
troubled by such uneven contraction, and might object even though the initial 
slack might itself have been undesirable.19 
In short, this Article’s analysis speaks to a fundamental issue confronting 
legal systems today: the merits of flexibility and forbearance in the law have 
long been in tension with the risks of selective and uneven enforcement. Slack 
sits at the heart of this tension, in that it facilitates the former but also enables 
the latter. Now comes data, which will almost certainly upend how slack 
operates and will thus alter the balance between law’s flexibility and law’s 
selective unfairness. Unsurprisingly, contemporary views on the relationship 
between data and slack reflect deep ambivalence: Most people intuitively 
recognize that slack holds risks, can be unfair, raises separation of powers 
concerns, and can create incentives to pass or retain bad laws.20 Yet, many 
would argue that data’s promise of more comprehensive observability and 
sanctioning of human conduct is also problematic, and that it is important to 
 
decriminalizing medical marijuana); State Medical Marijuana Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES 
(Aug. 23, 2021), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-medical-marijuana-laws.aspx. 
14.  See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 609.34 (2020) (making fornication a misdemeanor); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
§ 5/11-40 (2011) (making fornication a Class B misdemeanor); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-60 (1962) 
(criminalizing adultery and fornication; imposing fines and jail time); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750-30 (1931) 
(making adultery a felony). 
15.  Sodomy laws were in place in the U.S. as recently as 2003. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 
563 (2003). 
16.  Physician-assisted suicide is legal in a minority of U.S. states but is a felony in others. See generally 
Assisted Suicide Laws in the United States, PATIENTS RIGHTS COUNCIL (Jan. 6, 2017), 
http://www.patientsrightscouncil.org/site/assisted-suicide-state-laws/. 
17.  Cf. Zachary S. Price, Politics of Nonenforcement, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1119, 1146 (2015) 
(discussing troubling dynamics that stem from not enforcing problematic laws). 
18.  See discussion infra notes 100–101. 
19.  See generally Amy Harmon, As Cameras Track Detroit’s Residents, a Debate Ensues Over Racial Bias, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/08/us/detroit-facial-recognition-cameras.html. 
20.  See Price, supra note 17. 
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retain flexibility.21 We therefore need a framework for analyzing how slack 
should interact with data and for considering how to safeguard some slack in 
the system while managing its risks. This Article provides that framework. 
Part I explains the concept of slack or informal latitude in the legal system, 
maps the various ways it arises, and presents a bounded defense of slack, which 
recognizes its value while also acknowledging its potential risks and problems. 
In the interests of coherence, we largely focus on criminal law and regulatory 
compliance (such as taxation and licensing). But similar issues arise in private 
law as well. Part II discusses the effects of increasingly ubiquitous data on slack, 
emphasizing how data causes some types of slack to shrink, and to shrink more 
for some groups, such as less sophisticated populations and demographics 
subject to targeted enforcement. Part III articulates a framework for 
conceptualizing and managing the relationship between slack and data and 
proposes concrete policy solutions. 
Our Article’s focus on slack connects with themes raised by other scholars, 
including privacy, technology, and the harms of surveillance.22 The literature 
has become increasingly attuned to the effects of data on the operation and 
social meaning of the legal system, and innovative proposals floated by others 
reflect some of these tensions and concerns.23 Recent examples ask whether 
making crime impossible using technology (such as maximum vehicle speeds 
or algorithms that force compliance) is desirable,24 whether there is a right to 
break the law,25 or whether “personalized law” should play a greater role in legal 
system design in the age of technology.26 The intuition behind these proposals 
is that data and technology may require fundamental shifts in how law is 
 
21.  See, e.g., Richards, supra note 2. 
22.  See, e.g., Alessandro Acquisti et al., The Economics of Privacy, 54 J. ECON. LITERATURE 442 (2016) 
(surveying privacy literature and tradeoffs); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The “Smart” Fourth Amendment, 102 
CORNELL L. REV. 547 (2017); Mary Anne Franks, Democratic Surveillance, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 425 (2017); 
Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (2006); cf. ANITA L. ALLEN, WHY PRIVACY 
ISN’T EVERYTHING: FEMINIST REFLECTIONS ON PERSONAL ACCOUNTABILITY 5 (2003) (studying privacy 
prior to the data age); Daniel J. Solove, Data Mining and the Security-Liberty Debate, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 343 
(2008); Joshua D. Blank, Reconsidering Corporate Tax Privacy, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 31 (2014); Jannis Kallinikos, 
Reality Regained: An Inquiry into the Data Age, MIT TECH. REV. (Feb. 15, 2019), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/612818/reality-regained-an-inquiry-into-the-data-age/. 
23.  See, e.g., William Magnuson, A Unified Theory of Data, 58 HARV. J. LEGIS. 23 (2021); Salomé Viljoen, 
Democratic Data: A Relational Theory for Data Governance, 131 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2021). 
24.  Michael L. Rich, Should We Make Crime Impossible?, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 795, 796 (2013); see 
also Edward K. Cheng, Structural Laws and the Puzzle of Regulating Behavior, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 655, 657 (2006); 
Hartzog et al., supra note 4. Such shifts may change the fundamental architecture of how conduct is regulated. 
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 43–44 (1999). 
25.  See Timo Rademacher, Of New Technologies and Old Laws: Do We Need a Right to Violate the Law?, 5 
EUR. J. FOR SEC. RSCH. 39–58 (2020). 
26.  See, e.g., Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, The Death of Rules and Standards, 92 IND. L.J. 1401 
(2017); Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, A Framework for the New Personalization of Law, 86 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 333, 333 (2019) (arguing the personalization of law captures “[t]he idea that the law should be tailored 
to better fit the . . . context.”). 
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designed and enforced. However, the literature has yet to tackle the issue of 
diminishing slack head on. 
Our Article fills this void. Slack has long existed in law, often without 
fanfare or explicit recognition. Data has the potential to fundamentally 
transform the existence and significance of slack, and with it, the relationship 
among humans, governments, and law, ultimately calling many aspects of legal 
system design into question. Regardless of our attitudes towards slack, these 
dynamics ought to be better understood and managed. 
I. SLACK: THE INFORMAL LATITUDE TO FALL SHORT 
Legal systems intentionally incorporate flexibility and nuance through 
various means. Among the most traditional are the use of broad standards (such 
as willfulness or reasonableness), equitable relief, and penalty ranges.27 These 
features may be written into statutes, may exist due to agency action, or may 
emerge from case law. Through them, the legal system acknowledges that not 
every violation of law should or will be sanctioned once equitable and 
contextual factors are considered. 
Beyond formal features, however, legal systems universally tolerate 
informal spaces where law is not enforced and where those who violate it are 
not sanctioned.28 In this Part, we describe this informal “slack” and discuss how 
it relates to formal flexibility and leniency (I.A). We then articulate a taxonomy 
of the various causes and sources of slack in the legal system (I.B) and present 
a bounded argument in favor of preserving some slack in the legal system, even 
conceding its risks (I.C). 
A. Slack 
“Slack” refers to informal spaces in which governments, regulators, and 
other enforcers29 apply discretion in acknowledging violations, sanctioning, or 
sanctioning less harshly than the law specifies.30 Additionally, this includes cases 
in which enforcers, hampered by limited resources, lack the information needed 
to enforce. Importantly, we distinguish slack from formal equitable features. 
Our definition raises questions at the boundaries but is a useful starting 
heuristic. 
 
27.  See infra notes 31–45 and accompanying text. 
28.  See CAL. PENAL CODE § 459.5 (2014); see also Lee Ohanian, Why Shoplifting Is Now De Facto Legal in 
California, HOOVER INSTITUTION (Aug. 3, 2021), https://www.hoover.org/research/why-shoplifting-now-
de-facto-legal-california (explaining how the shoplifting statute is not enforced and violators are not 
prosecuted in California). 
29.  This might include third-party enforcers, such as corporations who conduct diligence on behalf of 
legal authorities in exchange for deferred- or non-prosecution or who serve as withholding agents in tax law. 
30.  ROBERT E. WORDEN & SARAH J. MCLEAN, Police Discretion in Law Enforcement, in ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 3596 (Gerben Bruinsma & David Weisburd eds., 2014). 
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To see the difference between formal flexibility and informal slack, it is 
helpful to look at criminal law. Formal equitable features are commonplace in 
criminal statutes, taking the form of tiered penalties or tiered severity of 
crimes.31 For example, a crime initially classified as a misdemeanor may be 
upgraded to a felony subject to graduated penalties if aggravating factors exist 
(such as use of a weapon, death, or bodily injury).32 Federal criminal statutes—
including statutes criminalizing assault, arson, and interference with federally 
protected activities such as voting—routinely incorporate graduated penalties 
and categories of offenses.33 For example, assault of officers and employees of 
the United States is subject to enhanced penalties if a deadly weapon is used or 
the assault results in bodily injury.34 While such provisions may not explicitly 
describe their features as “equitable,” adoption of tiered sanctions reflects law’s 
understanding that differing circumstances may render a crime more or less 
severe, which in turn anticipates taking facts, circumstances, and equities into 
account in rule design. 
Beyond this formal flexibility, however, a good deal of conduct covered by 
criminal statutes goes unpunished or is informally let slide. This may be due to 
deliberate resource-allocation decisions, plain luck, targeted non-
enforcement—including due to biases for or against certain groups—or 
idiosyncratic actions of on-the-ground enforcers (for example, a decision to not 
arrest a first-time offender but instead let them go with a warning).35 
The interaction of formal equitable provisions and informal slack can also 
be observed in regulatory areas such as tax. Formal tax law includes graduated 
penalties that reflect the broad range of reasons that taxpayers fail to comply.36 
Minor noncompliance may simply require payment of the additional tax due 
plus interest.37 More significant noncompliance, such as failure to withhold 
sufficient tax during the tax year, may trigger nondramatic monetary penalties.38 
More serious violations may trigger civil fraud penalties.39 Finally, taxpayers 
 
31.  Degree of Crime, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
32.  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 242 (allowing for an upgrade of a misdemeanor offense of deprivation of rights 
under color of law to a felony if aggravating factors exist). 
33.  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 113 (providing more severe penalties for assault resulting in serious bodily 
injury); 18 U.S.C. § 81 (authorizing more severe penalties for arson if life is placed in jeopardy); 18 U.S.C. 
§ 245(b) (allowing for graduated consequences for interference with federally protected activities if 
aggravating circumstances exist). 
34.  18 U.S.C. § 111. 
35.  See Wayne R. LaFave, The Police and Nonenforcement of the Law—Part 1, 1962 WIS. L. REV. 104, 104 
(1962). 
36.  See 26 U.S.C. §§ 6651–6658. 
37.  See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 6651 (providing the penalty for failure to pay tax on or before the date 
prescribed for payment of such tax). 
38.  See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 6654 (providing that the penalty for underpayment of estimated tax mirrors 
the interest charge); see also I.R.S. News Release, IR-2019-03 (Jan. 16, 2019), 
https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/irs-waives-penalty-for-many-whose-tax-withholding-and-estimated-tax-
payments-fell-short-in-2018 (describing IRS waiver of estimated tax penalties for 2018 year). 
39.  See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 6663 (civil penalty for underpayment of tax). 
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guilty of willful evasion may face criminal penalties and even jail time.40 Thus, 
through a series of calibrated formal provisions (including differing burdens of 
proof, statutes of limitations, broad standards, and defenses),41 tax law 
acknowledges (even if imperfectly) variations in noncompliance. But on top of 
these formal provisions is the reality that the IRS likely lacks the resources to 
enforce perfectly and may have to allocate resources to some priorities but not 
others, giving rise to areas of slack in the system.42 
Another tax example comes from the innocent spouse rules. Despite the 
general rule that spouses are jointly and severally liable for taxes, penalties, and 
interest on a joint tax return, tax law provides relief for an innocent spouse in 
situations formally specified by statute.43 These include situations where the 
fraud or error was due to the other spouse and the relief-seeking spouse had no 
knowledge, cases involving divorce, and other equitable reasons.44 Running 
parallel to these formal statutory spousal relief provisions, however, is the reality 
that there will be cases in which the IRS either has difficulty detecting fraud or 
error, or perhaps even notices the noncompliance but deems it minor enough 
to ignore.45 In these cases, taxpayers may, in effect, enjoy some informal 
latitude. 
More broadly, slack is a feature of virtually all noncriminal regulatory 
regimes where enforcement is not 100%, such as local regulations and 
ordinances, occupational licensing, securities law, and banking law.46 As Part 
I.B shows, slack hinges on a combination of information, resources, and 
discretion; because information is imperfect, resources are scarce, and 
discretion is pervasive, slack exists. 
This Article focuses on slack in the context of civil, criminal, or regulatory 
transgressions, but slack also exists at a more “micro” level, allowing very small 
actions that might not themselves rise to the level of legal violations but that 
 
40.  See, e.g., id. §§ 7201–7207 (criminal tax penalties). 
41.  See id. 
42.  See, e.g., I.R.S., Enforcement: Examinations, in 2017 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE DATA BOOK 21 
(2017), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/17databk.pdf (showing IRS audit data and indicating a 0.5% 2017 
audit rate). 
43.  See 26 U.S.C. §§ 6013(d)(3), 6015(b), (c), (f). 
44.  See id. 
45.  NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC., Researching the Causes of Noncompliance: An Overview of Upcoming Studies, in 
2010 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, 71, 81–85 (2010), https://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2020/11/arc10_vol2_causes_of_noncompliance.pdf. 
46.  See Price, supra note 17, at 1138. Private law analogues exist, though there, the inquiry concerns 
negotiations between private parties and decisions by judges. For example, plaintiffs must prove duty, breach, 
causation, and damages to prevail on tort negligence claims. See, e.g., Hayes v. D.C.I. Properties-D KY, LLC, 
563 S.W.3d 619, 622 (Ky. 2018). In making these determinations, information plays a vital role. Breach and 
causation may be difficult to prove and may require costly and time-consuming discovery. Thus, not every 
tort results in a lawsuit, partly due to information and proof problems. See e.g., Phillips v. PTS of Am., LLC, 
No. 3:17-CV-603-CHB, 2021 WL 1220997, at *27 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 31, 2021) (granting summary judgment 
on all claims against defendants because plaintiffs failed to prove causation). Scenarios in which one might 
commit a tort but not be held accountable may be described as slack. 
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may, if taken into account, hold economic and legal consequences. For example, 
various regulatory benefits (e.g., TSA PreCheck) are granted by applying metrics 
that may take some factors into account, such as a criminal record, but not 
others, such as less observable but potentially concerning behaviors.47 Failure 
to examine certain behaviors in regulatory decision-making constitutes a kind 
of “micro-level” slack where potentially problematic indicators may pass 
unnoticed or may not be given weight. As another example, private and 
government lending decisions rely on credit scores, income, assets, and tax 
return data in making credit determinations.48 Factors such as the borrower’s 
level of alcohol consumption, level of attention to detail, and social media 
behaviors have traditionally not been examined, even though such factors could 
plausibly be correlated with creditworthiness.49 As discussed further below, the 
operation of such micro-level slack is also changing in the data age.50 
We have thus far sought to distinguish formal equitable features from 
informal slack, but it is sometimes unclear whether a feature is formal or 
informal. For example, widely recognized prosecutorial authority to not pursue 
a case, to charge more lightly, or to drop charges stems from the reality that 
prosecutorial decisions are not reviewable.51 Such discretion could be 
considered a formal relief feature in that the law recognizes and allows it.52 But 
it might also be better described as slack, because there is an element of luck or 
discretion not specified formally. Perhaps it is a mixed case. The existence of 
mixed cases does not undercut our broader point, which is that in many 
contexts, slack exists alongside formal leniency. Because of this paired 
existence, the assessment of the desirability of the former necessarily depends 
on the design and existence of the latter. 
B. A Taxonomy of Slack 
We now offer a taxonomy of the various drivers of slack and contexts in 
which it arises. This discussion shows that slack is not just about resource and 
information constraints but may be a function of other factors. Moreover, there 
may be mixed cases in which slack exists for more than one reason. It is 
 
47.  Disqualifying Offenses and Other Factors, TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.tsa.gov/disqualifying-
offenses-factors (last visited Aug. 23, 2021). 
48.  U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., USDA RURAL DEVELOPMENT HANDBOOK 4-1 to 4-70 (2019), 
 https://www.rd.usda.gov/files/3550-1chapter04.pdf. 
49.  See Mandukhai Ganbat et al., Effect of Psychological Factors on Credit Risk: A Case Study of the Microlending 
Service in Mongolia, 11 BEHAV. SCI. 1, 6 (2021); Yanhao Wei et al., Credit Scoring with Social Network Data, 35 
MKTG. SCI. 234, 234 (2015). 
50.  See discussion infra notes 165–167 and accompanying text (describing micro-lender Lenddo’s 
algorithm). 
51.  See, e.g., Rebecca Krauss, The Theory of Prosecutorial Discretion in Federal Law: Origins and Development, 6 
SETON HALL CIR. REV. 1, 2 (2012). 
52.  Id. at 4. 
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important to note upfront that this taxonomy is not offered as a normative 
justification for slack but simply as a description of how it comes about. We do 
not claim that any of slack’s underlying drivers are themselves fair, defensible, 
or optimal. In fact, it is likely that the allocation of slack throughout the system 
will reflect factors such as bias, politics, and privilege, and is unlikely to be 
distributively just.53 While (as Part I.C argues) there are normative justifications 
for safeguarding slack, this normative case must be made independently. 
1. Prioritization of Scarce Enforcement Resources 
A key context in which slack arises is when enforcers have scarce resources, 
requiring prioritization.54 Prioritization determinations can range from 
decisions by a local police force to allocate patrols to certain neighborhoods, 
which may lead to crimes in other neighborhoods not being observed, to high-
level decisions by federal agencies to prioritize enforcement against certain 
crimes or in certain geographical areas. The IRS, for example, which has 
experienced highly public budget woes in recent years, regularly announces 
enforcement “campaigns,” reflecting its focus on certain issues.55 Immigration 
enforcement priorities can also shift considerably with a new presidential 
administration. Days after taking office, President Trump issued several 
executive orders56 outlining new immigration enforcement plans, which 
included construction of a wall along the U.S.–Mexico border, additional border 
patrol agents, and expedited removals, all of which marked a sharp departure 
from Obama administration priorities.57 Four years later, newly elected 
President Biden issued a proclamation hours after his inauguration announcing 
(among other immigration enforcement changes) that “no more American 
taxpayer dollars be diverted to construct a border wall.”58 These resource-
 
53.  See Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 
3 (1998). 
54.  See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 543 (2001); 
Leigh Osofsky, The Case for Categorical Nonenforcement, 69 TAX L. REV. 73, 74 (2015). 
55.  For example, in 2019, the IRS Large Business and International Division rolled out a total of ten 
new “campaigns.” See Large Business and International Compliance Campaigns, I.R.S., 
https://www.irs.gov/businesses/large-business-and-international-compliance-campaigns (last updated June 
10, 2021). 
56.  See, e.g., Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements, Exec. Order No. 13,767, 
82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/01/30/2017-
02095/border-security-and-immigration-enforcement-improvements; Enhancing Public Safety in the 
Interior of the United States, Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017), 
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/01/30/2017-02102/enhancing-public-safety-in-the-
interior-of-the-united-states. 
57.  See, e.g., Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump Orders Mexican Border Wall to be Built and Plans to Block Syrian 
Refugees, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/25/us/politics/refugees-
immigrants-wall-trump.html. 
58.  Proclamation No. 10142, 86 Fed. Reg. 7225 (Jan. 27, 2021).  
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prioritization decisions have obvious impacts on whether the law gets enforced 
in the case of certain behaviors or against certain populations. 
Resource prioritization and imperfect enforcement are not necessarily 
indefensible. In fact, some theoretical analyses deem less than 100% 
enforcement as welfare maximizing,59 or suggest that high penalties with low 
detection probabilities may be optimal because actual action is costly but threats 
are free.60 Such analysis by implication endorses a degree of imperfect 
enforcement. But the flip side of nonenforcement is that some unlawful 
behaviors are not sanctioned. This presents tradeoffs, for example, in the form 
of reduced morale, unfairness, expressive harms, and other impacts.61 Further, 
it may be difficult in practice to specify optimal penalty and enforcement levels 
in advance, particularly as situations change and strategies must adjust.62 
Moreover, there is an obvious danger that selective nonenforcement of entire 
categories of offenses may be driven by politics or bias.63 
2. Lack of Information 
Information barriers are technically a species of resource limitation,64 but 
because data and information are central to our Article, we discuss this point 
separately. 
Information is clearly essential to enforcement, and its absence makes full 
enforcement difficult. Information gaps are therefore one of the most 
important factors contributing to slack.65 For example, IRS tax data show that 
failure to declare individual business or self-employment income is a significant 
contributor to the gross tax gap (i.e., the difference between taxes owed and 
those actually paid on time).66 This type of income is often not subject to 
reporting or withholding by third parties (e.g., employers, banks), and because 
the IRS does not receive corroborating information about its existence, 
taxpayers frequently underreport it.67 Lack of information can be overcome by 
allocating more resources. The IRS could increase audits or could impose 
additional reporting obligations on third-party payors. But these options are 
costly to the government and to private actors. 
 
59.  See Becker, supra note 7. Economic approaches may treat crime (theft) as a utility transfer with a 
cost. 
60.  See generally Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Frederick Wandschneider, Antitrust and the ‘Beckerian 
Proposition’: The Effects of Investigation and Fines on Cartels 1, 4 (U. E. Anglia, Working Paper No. 13-9, 2016). 
61.  See Osofsky, supra note 54, at 76. 
62.  See generally Max Minzner, Should Agencies Enforce?, 99 MINN. L. REV. 2113 (2015). 
63.  Cf. Osofsky, supra note 54. 
64.  See generally Minzner, supra note 62, at 2131. 
65.  Id. 
66.  I.R.S., FEDERAL TAX COMPLIANCE RESEARCH: TAX GAP ESTIMATES FOR TAX YEARS 2011–2013 
15–16 (2019), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1415.pdf. 
67.  Cf. 26 U.S.C. § 6041 (relating to information reporting at source). 
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In various contexts, law has been specifically designed to overcome 
information barriers. Returning to tax, the existence of third-party income 
reporting and tax withholding for some income (for example, wages) does lower 
information asymmetries between the IRS and taxpayers, and encourages 
compliance.68 As another example, the use of nonprosecution and deferred-
prosecution agreements in corporate prosecutions paired with respondeat 
superior liability incentivizes corporations to leverage their superior access to 
information and insider knowledge to monitor employees and hold them 
accountable.69 However, such solutions (which themselves introduce new risks) 
are not universally in place, and so slack persists. 
3. Deliberate Nonenforcement of Imperfect Laws 
Slack may also exist where enforcers make deliberate nonenforcement 
decisions driven by the law’s imperfections rather than by resource constraints. 
Such decisions stem from judgments that the law on the books is flawed or 
questionable, or that enforcement is inadvisable or problematic. 
Flawed laws may come in different flavors: 
Out-of-Step Laws. Some laws may be outdated or out of step with 
contemporary expectations. In South Carolina, for example, long-standing laws 
against minors playing a pinball machine70 and operation of a public dance hall 
on Sundays71 remain on the books despite a 2016 legislative effort to amend 
them.72 Other laws may be just strange.73 Yet others may reflect values that have 
become increasingly contested. 
 
68.  Id. § 3402. 
69.  See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen & Samuel W. Buell, The Law of Corporate Investigations and the Global Expansion 
of Corporate Criminal Enforcement, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. 697, 706 (2020); Rachel Brewster & Samuel W. Buell, The 
Market for Global Anticorruption Enforcement, 80 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 193, 210 (2017); Brandon L. Garrett, 
Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, 97 VA. L. REV. 1775, 1778 (2011). 
70.  S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-19-2430 (2008) (“It is unlawful for a minor under the age of eighteen to play 
a pinball machine.”). 
71.  S.C. CODE ANN. § 52-13-10 (1962). 
72.  S.C. H4535, LEGISCAN, https://legiscan.com/SC/bill/H4535/2015 (last updated Mar. 10, 2016) 
(showing the bill died in Senate Judiciary Committee). 
73.  See, e.g., LITTLE ROCK, ARK., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 18, tit. II, § 18-54 (1988) (“No person 
shall sound the horn on a vehicle at any place where cold drinks or sandwiches are served after 9:00pm (Code 
1961, § 25-74)”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2331.12 (West 1953) (“No person shall be arrested during a 
sitting of the senate or house of representatives, within the hall where such session is being held, or in any 
court of justice, during the sitting of such court, or on Sunday, or on the fourth day of July.”); SKAMANIA 
COUNTY, WASH., ORDINANCE 1984-2 (1984) (“The slaying of Sasquatch which is deemed a misdemeanor 
shall be punishable by a $500.00 fine and up to 6 months in the county jail, or both.”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 436.600 (West 1972) (“No person shall sell, exchange, offer to sell or exchange, display, or possess living 
baby chicks, ducklings, or other fowl or rabbits which have been dyed or colored; nor dye or color any baby 
chicks, ducklings, or other fowl or rabbits; nor sell, exchange, offer to sell or exchange or to give away baby 
chicks, ducklings, or other fowl or rabbits, under two (2) months of age in any quantity less than six (6), 
except that any rabbit weighing three (3) pounds or more may be sold at an age of six (6) weeks. Any person 
who violates this section shall be fined not less than $100 nor more than $500.”). 
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Society may be reluctant to enforce laws that have become controversial. 
For example, a Louisiana judge recently had to halt jury selection after running 
out of jurors in a case involving felony marijuana charges.74 There, prospective 
jurors had voiced objections to marijuana criminalization, which prompted 
their dismissal.75 Still, such cultural shifts that lead a community to regard 
certain laws as out of step and to enforce them no longer are likely to occur 
unevenly, so we cannot assume that such laws will never be enforced. For 
example, different societies—or even different geographic locations within a 
society—may approach differently enforcement of laws criminalizing adultery 
and sodomy.76 
Too Much Law. Relatedly, slack may develop if law is perceived as too 
onerous or pervasive, such that demanding total compliance is viewed as 
excessive or impossible.77 Some have noted how criminal laws tend to be 
overbroad and overinclusive, partly due to legislator incentives to enact 
draconian laws as a “tough against crime” signal and to leave hard enforcement 
choices to judges, prosecutors, and others on the ground.78 Political process 
dynamics may cause norms to develop in which enforcers understand that not 
all criminal behavior can or should be sanctioned.79 As discussed below, 
stringent laws make full compliance more difficult and noncompliance more 
likely, which may in turn suggest that discretion or mercy are necessary.80 But 
discretion and mercy also raise rule-of-law issues and may incentivize 
legislatures to leave bad laws on the books.81 
Poorly Calibrated Laws. Deliberate nonenforcement may also occur where 
penalties are perceived to be too severe in relation to the crime. There is some 
evidence that jurors may be less likely to convict as penalties become more 
severe.82 This is plausibly true of other enforcers as well, including police and 
 
74.  Matt Sledge, A New Orleans man faced a felony marijuana charge; too many potential jurors wouldn’t consider 
it, NOLA.COM (Oct. 9, 2019), https://www.nola.com/news/courts/article_b01d0794-eade-11e9-8114-
0f789d4d4ccc.html. Ultimately, defendant pled to a misdemeanor charge instead. Id. 
75.  Id. 
76.  See supra sources cited in notes 14 and 15. 
77.  See, e.g., Bayless Manning, Hyperlexis: Our National Disease, 71 NW. U. L. REV. 767 (1977); cf. Mila 
Sohoni, The Idea of “Too Much Law,” 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1585 (2012). 
78.  Stuntz, supra note 54 (noting American criminal law “covers far more conduct than any jurisdiction 
could possibly punish” and “the story of American criminal law is a story of tacit cooperation between 
prosecutors and legislators, each of whom benefits from more and broader crimes, and growing 
marginalization of judges, who alone are likely to opt for narrower liability rules rather than broader ones”); 
Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream on: The Obama Administration’s Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, 
the DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 781, 856–57 (2013) (noting that strict laws, 
combined with a large offender population and constrained enforcement resources, means executive 
discretion is inevitable). 
79.  See Stuntz, supra note 54, at 533–39. 
80.  Id. at 594–96. 
81.  See discussion infra accompanying note 98; see also Price, supra note 17; cf. Stephanos Bibas, The Need 
for Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 369 (2010). 
82.  See, e.g., Norbert L. Kerr, Severity of Prescribed Penalty and Mock Jurors’ Verdicts, 36 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCH. 1431 (1978); James Andreoni, Reasonable Doubt and the Optimal Magnitude of Fines: Should the Penalty 
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regulators, who may choose nonenforcement as a “rough justice” solution to 
excessively high penalties.83 
Unjust Laws. Slack may also arise where enforcers perceive the underlying 
law to be unjust and choose not to enforce it. The category of unjust laws 
overlaps with poorly calibrated or out-of-step laws, but we define it to include 
laws that are more fundamentally unfair. Particularly egregious historical 
examples of unjust laws commonly highlighted in the legal and philosophical 
literature include legal regimes in Nazi Germany and laws regarding slavery and 
aiding of fugitive slaves.84 A contemporary example of an unjust law is the U.S. 
federal government’s “zero tolerance” border-control policy announced in May 
2018 and its impact on children.85 Under that new enforcement policy, all adults 
crossing the border without inspection were prosecuted regardless of asylum 
requests or accompanying minors.86 The policy, adopted under Trump and 
rescinded by the Biden administration,87 resulted in the separation of 
approximately 3,000 children from their families.88 
The problem of unjust or immoral laws has spawned a vast theoretical 
literature regarding whether such laws are legitimate and whether citizens have 
a duty to obey them.89 Here, legal positivists (dominant in the American legal 
tradition) tend to view law as separate from morality, viewing even bad laws as 
legitimate if enacted through legitimate government authority.90 This stands in 
contrast to some natural law approaches, which view immoral or evil laws as 
lacking the authority of law.91 Some legal positivists may leave room for 
disobedience in cases of particularly unjust laws,92 in contrast to firm adherents 
 
Fit the Crime?, 22 RAND J. ECON. 385 (1991); Neil Vidmar, Effects of Decision Alternatives on the Verdicts and 
Social Perceptions of Simulated Jurors, 22(2) J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH 211 (1972); cf. Martin F. Kaplan & 
Sharon Krupa, Severe Penalties Under the Control of Others Can Reduce Guilt Verdicts, 10 LAW & PSYCH. REV. 1 
(1986). 
83.  See Stuntz, supra note 54. 
84.  See, e.g., ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (rev. 
ed. 1984). 
85.  See WILLIAM A. KANDEL, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45266, THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S “ZERO 
TOLERANCE” IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT POLICY (2021). 
86.  Id. 
87.  OFF. OF THE ATT’Y GEN. OF THE U.S., MEMORANDUM FOR ALL PROSECUTORS: RESCINDING 
THE ZERO-TOLERANCE POLICY FOR OFFENSES UNDER 8 U.S.C. § 1325(A) (Jan. 26, 2021). 
88.  KANDEL, supra note 85. 
89.  See, e.g., J.C. Oleson, The Antigone Dilemma: When the Paths of Law and Morality Diverge, 29 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 669 (2007). 
90.  See, e.g., Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Democracy, The Constitution, and Legal Positivism in America: Lessons from 
a Winding and Troubled History, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1457 (2015) (exploring the rise of legal positivism in the United 
States and the influence of John Austin and Jeremy Bentham in the 1800s); see also H.L.A. HART, THE 
CONCEPT OF LAW (3d ed. 2012). 
91.  See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, The Natural Duty to Obey the Law, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1 (discussing five 
theories about natural duty to obey the law and exploring their application to unjust laws). 
92.  For example, those characterized as “inclusive legal positivists” do not insist on complete 
separation between the validity of a law and its moral merits as a rule. See, e.g., Richard Dagger & David 
Lefkowitz, Politcal Obligation, STAN. ENCYC. OF PHIL. (last revised Mar. 15, 2021) (reviewing shifting positions 
in legal positivism), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/political-obligation/. 
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of the doctrine of political obligation.93 Yet most thinkers hold a qualified view 
of political obligation, conceding that political obligation’s reach does not 
extend to some laws.94 Philosophical debates about obligation to obey unjust 
laws have clear implications for the evaluation of slack. If there is no duty to 
obey unjust laws despite political obligation, then specific areas of slack become 
important and justifiable, not just because of human foibles but because of law’s 
imperfections. Or put more bluntly, a loss of slack—due, for example, to 
increased data—that increases enforcement of unjust laws would be regarded 
as problematic. 
4. Exercise of Mercy 
A related reason why slack may develop is if enforcers deploy ad hoc 
discretion to exercise mercy and to forbear from punishment. Debates over 
mercy are pervasive in criminal law and moral philosophy,95 with scholars 
contesting how mercy squares with the retributivist goals of criminal law.96 
Some argue that there is no role for mercy in criminal law, though equitable 
discretion—attenuating punishment according to the severity of the crime or 
to mitigating circumstances—may be appropriate and even necessary,97 
particularly given the tendency of criminal law to be overbroad.98 
 
93.  See, e.g., id. (outlining differences between exclusive legal positivism—the more classic version 
(Bentham, Austin, and Hart)—and the later inclusive legal positivism); MICHAEL HUEMER, THE PROBLEM 
OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY: AN EXAMINATION OF THE RIGHT TO COERCE AND THE DUTY TO OBEY 
(2012); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (Harvard Univ. Press, rev. ed. 1999). 
94.  See generally Michael Huemer, The Duty to Disregard the Law, 12 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 1 (2018) (sketching 
scholarly perspectives embracing a qualified view of political obligation doctrine in evaluating jury 
nullification) (citing THOMAS CHRISTIANO, THE CONSTITUTION OF EQUALITY: DEMOCRATIC AUTHORITY 
AND ITS LIMITS (2008); Dan Markel, Retributive Justice and the Demands of Democratic Citizenship, 1 VA. J. CRIM. 
L. 1 (2012)). Of course, more behavioral and consequentialist approaches note that the relationship between 
the justness of laws and the propensity of the governed to obey them may be endogenous. See generally Janice 
Nadler, Flouting the Law, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1399 (2005). 
95.  See, e.g., JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY (1988); 
FORGIVENESS, MERCY, AND CLEMENCY (Austin Sarat & Nasser Hussain eds., 2007) (collection of essays on 
the subject); Dan Markel, Against Mercy, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1421 (2004); Rachel E. Barkow, The Ascent of the 
Administrative State and the Demise of Mercy, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1332 (2019) (arguing that ascent of the 
administrative state and its attendant conceptions of law furthered skepticism of executive clemency and jury 
nullification). 
96.  See generally MICHAEL S. MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 
(Oxford Univ. Press 1997) (defending retributivism); Douglas N. Husak, Retribution in Criminal Theory, 37 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 959 (2000) (critiquing Moore and offering a more “tempered” defense of retributivism). 
97.  See, e.g., MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 95, at 172; Markel, supra note 95, at 1431–32, 1435–37. 
See generally Carol S. Steiker, Tempering or Tampering? Mercy and the Administration of Criminal Justice, in 
FORGIVENESS, MERCY, AND CLEMENCY 16, 26 (Austin Sarat & Nasser Hussain eds., 2007) (referring to 
those that argue from feelings of retributive anger as “mercy skeptics”); Markel, supra note 95, at 1435–43 
(distinguishing equitable discretion from mercy by defining mercy as “remission of deserved punishment” 
that is suspect because it awards lesser punishment for reasons of “compassion, bias, corruption, or caprice” 
and equitable discretion as “leniency that is motivated by other reasons that are more properly viewed as 
triggering equitable or justice-enhancing discretion”). 
98.  See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
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The analytical distinction between mercy and equitable discretion reflects a 
tension in criminal law: Discretion and forbearance are necessary, but discretion 
can lead to bias and uneven enforcement.99 Carol Steiker has described the 
“paradox of mercy” as follows: Mercy in criminal justice “is extremely attractive 
as a way of mitigating the draconian harshness of our current penological 
regime”100 but at the same time “it is likely that the institutional opportunities 
for the exercise of mercy in the criminal justice system are also sources 
of . . . [much] of the system’s disparate impact along the lines of race, ethnicity, 
and class.”101 The issue for mercy-skeptical scholars is that while some 
discretion and flexibility are necessary to do justice, unprincipled mercy and 
compassion based on warm feelings can be fed by conscious and unconscious 
biases and may lead to disparities.102 These risks may be greater if some groups 
are more adept at expressing remorse or asking for lighter punishment because, 
for example, they possess more cultural capital.103 The problem is compounded 
by the fact that it can be difficult in practice to distinguish between appropriate 
exercise of discretion and unprincipled grants of mercy. 
5. Executive Politics 
Another important context in which slack arises is in Executive Branch 
nonenforcement.104 Presidential executive orders are sometimes issued not to 
enforce certain laws. Examples include marijuana prohibitions and immigration 
laws—as was the case with President Obama’s Deferred Action for Childhood 
Arrivals (DACA) program and Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and 
Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA) initiatives.105 As scholars have noted, the 
Reagan and the two Bush administrations also engaged in so-called 
 
99.  Steiker, supra note 97, at 19. 
100.  Id. 
101.  Id. 
102.  See, e.g., Susan A. Bandes, Remorse and Demeanour in the Courtroom: Cognitive Science and the Evaluation 
of Contrition, in THE INTEGRITY OF THE CRIMINAL PROCESS: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 309 (Jill Hunter 
et al. eds., 2016). 
103.  See, e.g., M. Eve Hanan, Remorse Bias, 83 MO. L. REV. 301 (2018); Bandes, supra note 102; Stephen 
Porter & Leanne ten Brinke, Dangerous Decisions: A Theoretical Framework for Understanding How Judges Assess 
Credibility in the Courtroom, 14 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCH. 119 (2009) (examining problems with 
determinations of trustworthiness based on defendant criminal expressions); Jeremy A. Blumenthal, A Wipe 
of the Hands, A Lick of the Lips: The Validity of Demeanor Evidence in Assessing Witness Credibility, 72 NEB. L. REV. 
1157 (1993). 
104.  See Peter L. Strauss, The President and Choices Not to Enforce, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107 
(2000) for an earlier treatment. See also Kate Andrias, The President’s Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031 
(2013); Mary M. Cheh, When Congress Commands a Thing to be Done: An Essay on Marbury v. Madison, Executive 
Inaction, and the Duty of the Courts to Enforce the Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 253 (2003). 
105.  See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Love & Arpit K. Garg, Presidential Inaction and the Separation of Powers, 112 MICH. 
L. REV. 1195 (2014); Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671 (2014); 
Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 78; Michael Sant’Ambrogio, The Extra-Legislative Veto, 102 GEO. L.J. 351 (2014). 
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“deregulation through nonenforcement.”106 We treat executive 
nonenforcement decisions as slack because, even though they do not happen 
off the books, it is difficult to predict upfront when such orders will be given. 
Thus, in terms of impact and popular understanding, executive 
nonenforcement functions more like informal latitude. 
A substantial literature addresses the extent to which the president may 
legitimately order blanket nonenforcement of laws and the risks such executive 
nonenforcement presents.107 Scholars have questioned whether deliberate 
nonenforcement violates separation of powers principles, whether it 
contravenes the “Take Care” Clause, whether it causes bad laws to remain on 
the books,108 and whether it undermines the rule of law.109 Scholars have also 
attempted to articulate the boundaries of permissible presidential 
nonenforcement.110 Most, but not all, have argued that while nonenforcement 
based on resource constraints is permissible and unavoidable, nonenforcement 
based on blanket substantive policy preferences is not.111 It is unclear, however, 
whether these lines can be effectively administered in practice, nor is it easy to 
determine whether lines drawn are well placed from a welfarist perspective. 
Scholars also have debated administrative agency nonenforcement.112 
Because agencies are part of the Executive Branch, agency nonenforcement 
also implicates separation of powers, fairness, and procedural concerns.113 With 
a few exceptions, agency nonenforcement decisions generally are not 
 
106.  See Daniel T. Deacon, Note, Deregulation Through Nonenforcement, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 795 (2010); 
Price, supra note 17 (discussing nonenforcement under Republican and Democrat administrations). 
107.  See sources cited supra notes 104–106. 
108.  Price, supra note 17, at 1146 (noting that “[w]hile prosecutorial discretion provides a crucial safety 
valve against rigorous enforcement of outdated or unrealistic laws, persistent nonenforcement also permits 
laws to remain in place that would be politically intolerable if fully enforced”). 
109.  Price, supra note 17; David S. Rubenstein, Taking Care of the Rule of Law, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
101 (2018). 
110.  Andrias, supra note 104 (calling for more agency coordination, disclosure, and transparency). 
111.  See, e.g., Price, supra note 105, at 675 (noting that presidential nonenforcement authorities do not 
extend to “prospective licensing of prohibited conduct” or to “policy-based nonenforcement of federal laws 
for entire categories of offenders”); Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 78, at 856 (“Presidential prerogative does 
not justify a refusal to enforce the immigration laws in ordinary, non-critical circumstances.”) (setting forth 
defenses to presidential breach of duty including (1) law’s unconstitutionality, (2) interference with another 
presidential constitutional power, (3) equity, and (4) resource constraints); see also Osofsky, supra note 54, at 
78 (“[S]cholars have reached a near consensus that policy-based nonenforcement is impermissible, whereas 
nonenforcement resulting from enforcement resource limitations may be permissible.”); cf. Peter L. 
Markowitz, Prosecutorial Discretion Power at Its Zenith: The Power to Protect Liberty, 97 B.U. L. REV. 489 (2017) 
(arguing that presidential nonenforcement power reaches its “zenith” when physical liberty and its deprivation 
are at stake). 
112.  See Osofsky, supra note 54; Aaron L. Nielson, How Agencies Choose Whether to Enforce the Law: A 
Preliminary Investigation, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1517 (2018) [hereinafter Nielson, Agencies]; AARON L. 
NIELSON, WAIVERS, EXEMPTIONS, AND PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION: AN EXAMINATION OF AGENCY 
NONENFORCEMENT PRACTICES (2017) [hereinafter NIELSON, WAIVERS]. 
113.  See Nielson, Agencies, supra note 112, at 1520 (noting that “nonenforcement implicates basic 
notions of fairness and administrative regularity,” raising concerns about abuse, and noting that “‘government 
by waiver,’ if taken too far, is antithetical to liberty”). 
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reviewable by courts.114 While some scholars have argued that there are merits 
to allowing agencies to categorically underenforce the law,115 others have 
identified risks. These include the risk of regulatory capture,116 the risk of 
undesirable dynamics between state and private actors,117 and the risk that 
underenforcement discretion may be fed by—and may in turn feed—the 
passage of overly broad or aggressive laws.118 Yet, it is also clear from 
administrative law scholarship that nonenforcement is inevitable in agency 
practice due to resource constraints and the need to prioritize.119 
The foregoing discussion has shown that slack arises in different and 
potentially overlapping contexts, including resource and informational 
constraints, deliberate underenforcement of problematic laws of various kinds, 
decisions to exercise mercy, and executive branch politics. Existing strands of 
scholarly literature have touched on these phenomena from different angles. 
Part I tied these threads together conceptually. 
Our discussion suggests that slack holds both positives and negatives, 
depending on the underlying contexts in which it arises. On the positive side, 
when paired with law’s formal equitable features, slack permits flexibility to 
accommodate human failures and imperfect laws, particularly in light of 
resource constraints. But the flip side is that slack also holds risks of bias and 
politically driven decisions, and may raise rule of law and separation of powers 
concerns. Throughout the above examination of slack’s sources, it is obvious 
that racial, ethnic, socioeconomic, gender, and other biases are likely to play an 
important role in determining how and where slack appears in the system.120 
Thus, for example, mercy may be disproportionately bestowed upon privileged 
groups, executive-branch enforcement and nonenforcement decisions may 
disproportionately ensnare more vulnerable populations, and resource-
prioritization decisions may result in intentional or unintentional targeting. 
 
114.  Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After 
Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 653 (1985); Jentry Lanza, Note, Agency Underenforcement as Reviewable 
Abdication, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1171 (2018). 
115.  See Osofsky, supra note 54. 
116.  Minzner, supra note 62, at 2116 (challenging superiority of specialized agency enforcement and 
noting that “regulatory capture can produce underenforcement”). 
117.  See Richard A. Epstein, Government By Waiver, NAT’L AFFS., Spring 2011, at 39. 
118.  Id. (identifying the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and the Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act as two complex statutes that will implicate and exacerbate nonenforcement and 
“government by waiver”). 
119.  See Osofsky, supra note 54, at 82–83; Nielson, Agencies, supra note 112, at 1532–34; Delahunty & 
Yoo, supra note 78, at 856 (Obama Administration’s immigration nonenforcement “is the almost inevitable 
outcome of . . . a de facto delegation system that Congress has established in the immigration area” and that 
“the combination of a massive illegal immigrant population, extremely stringent laws regarding deportability, 
and inadequate resourcing for enforcement gives the President virtually unfettered control to decide who 
remains in the country and who is removed.”). 
120.  See Stuntz, supra note 54, at 575. 
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C. The Bounded Case for Slack 
Thus far, this Article has focused on slack in the legal system, showing how 
it is valuable but holds risks. Part II will turn to the follow-up question of how 
ubiquitous data affects slack. But first, we need to evaluate whether slack is 
desirable in the first place. Part I.C articulates a bounded argument in favor of 
preserving some slack in the legal system, even conceding its risks. 
1. A Constraint on Too Much Law 
Slack serves as an aggregate constraint on government power. As discussed 
in Part I.B, there may be a cumulative tendency to enact too many laws such 
that enforcing them all would be impossible.121 In criminal law, for example, 
some have noted that legislators have incentives to enact overbroad criminal 
laws and then leave it to judges and prosecutors to determine when to forbear 
or not prosecute.122 Similar forces are at work in compliance and regulatory 
systems, although the net accumulation of too much law can arise even where 
lawmakers are not specifically driven to demonstrate they are “tough on 
crime.”123 
The existence of too many laws creates problems for both governments 
and the governed. Even in a relatively stable participatory democracy with laws 
that are individually plausible, the sheer volume of rules could make consistent 
compliance difficult, particularly with respect to rules that are not morally 
intuitive but regulatory in nature.124 For example, even if a single penalty for 
failure to file a required business form on time does not seem unduly onerous, 
if there are hundreds of similar filing requirements, definitions, and exceptions, 
we might find that modest penalties and compliance burdens, while 
unproblematic alone, become onerous in totality. 
Where over-legislation or over-regulation exists but enforcement is 
imperfect, it might be argued that we have in effect accepted a system in which 
a wide range of conduct is eligible for sanction, but in reality, only some 
percentage of violations (call it x%) is actually sanctioned. Compliance and 
enforcement may be random with respect to each individual act, but in the 
aggregate, the average person can reliably expect that there is some slack with 
respect to (100 - x)% of violations.125 Taking the argument a step further, if 
people start getting punished for significantly more than x% of violations such 
 
121.  Id. at 507; Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 78, at 856–57. 
122.  See Stuntz, supra note 54, at 529–33; Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 78, at 792–95. 
123.  See Stuntz, supra note 54, at 509–10. 
124.  See Osofsky, supra note 54, at 82. 
125.  We are not claiming that legal enforcement is distributed evenly across society. Studies across a 
range of legal regimes reveal enforcement biases. See, e.g., NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC. SERV., ANNUAL REPORT 
TO CONGRESS 79–93 (2014). Our point is that individuals are all likely “caught” for only a fraction of 
violations (even if that fraction is not uniform across individuals). 
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that they are bearing impossibly high penalties or compliance burdens, then the 
system is not working as designed. If so, then the underlying legal regime should 
be revisited.126 
2. A Constraint on Government Incursions into the Personal 
Total enforcement would require total surveillance, or at least much more 
aggressive attempts at observation and detection. But, as recognized in the 
privacy literature, it is risky for the government to possess substantially 
complete information about everyone. Perhaps most importantly, total 
information risks an unintended shift in the relationship between government 
and individuals and ultimately in the individual’s sense of self separate from 
government and government institutions.127 Literature on the implications of 
government surveillance, including “total surveillance,” details a range of 
potential harms, such as chilling of personal liberties and intellectual freedom, 
ensnaring of subjects in increasingly broad surveillance dragnets, and unleashing 
of abusive behaviors—e.g., blackmail, coercion, and discrimination—triggered 
by power disparities.128 
In the abstract, we may find that many (though not everyone) would trade 
the advantages of full enforcement of the law for continued space between 
government and individuals.129 However, that commitment to a world in which 
the government does not know everything will be tested in cases of shocking, 
heinous, or high-impact events, such as violent crimes, terrorist attacks, or 
public health crises, or if and when individuals become victims themselves. In 
those situations, we might see demands that the government aggressively use 
data to bring perpetrators to justice, regardless of the incursions that would 
result, and regardless of philosophical commitments voiced ex ante. 
 
126.  Relatedly, one of us has argued that nonenforcement of tax debts can serve a valuable social 
insurance function. See Shu-Yi Oei, Who Wins When Uncle Sam Loses? Social Insurance and the Forgiveness of Tax 
Debts, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 421, 462–63 (2012) [hereinafter Oei, Who Wins]; Shu-Yi Oei, Getting More by 
Asking Less: Justifying and Reforming Tax Law’s Offer-in-Compromise Procedure, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1071, 1096 (2012) 
[hereinafter Oei, Getting More]. 
127.  See, e.g., Richards, supra note 2, at 1956; DAVID LYON, SURVEILLANCE STUDIES 89–92 (2007); 
SURVEILLANCE AND DEMOCRACY 35 (Kevin D. Haggerty & Minas Samatas, eds., 2010); THE 
SURVEILLANCE STUDIES READER 35–49 (Sean P. Hier & Josh Greenberg, eds., 2007); see also Andrej Zwitter, 
Oskar J. Gstrein & Evan Yap, Digital Identity and the Blockchain: Universal Identity Management and the Concept of 
the ‘Self-Sovereign’ Individual, FRONTIERS IN BLOCKCHAIN, 11 (2020); Anuj Puri, A Theory of Group Privacy, 30 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 27–28), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3686202. 
128.  See sources cited supra note 127; Brayne, supra note 11, at 986–89; cf. Rebecca Wexler, Privacy as 
Privilege: The Stored Communications Act and Internet Evidence, 134 HARV. L. REV. 2721, 2786 (2021) (discussing 
how data privacy law harms defendants’ rights). 
129.  Some advocates of the “information wants to be free” view of data might prioritize free 
movement of data. See, e.g., R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants to Be Free: Intellectual Property and the Mythologies of 
Control, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 995, 999 n.14 (2003). 
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3. A Second Space for Substantive Debate 
Scholars have long recognized that the legislative process contains 
numerous imperfections, pathologies, and misaligned incentives.130 For 
example, statutes are often drafted hastily and reviewed by legislative aides 
rather than elected representatives.131 In the criminal law context, as noted, 
legislators have incentives to enact harsh and overinclusive laws that generate 
messaging benefits, leaving discretionary sentencing to prosecutors and 
judges.132 Highly technical legislation (such as tax statutes) may be poorly 
drafted and require revisions after the fact.133 Legislators may feel compelled to 
push legislation through in the absence of sufficient information as to whether 
the law is really administrable or well-designed or whether the penalties are 
fair.134 These pathologies exist even in the case of well-intentioned laws. And 
laws, once passed, may be difficult to amend or repeal, for example, due to 
partisan politics.135 
In light of these pathologies, slack offers an imperfect second space for 
reevaluating laws that have been enacted and for mitigating problematic effects, 
serving as a safety valve in the event problematic laws are passed and not 
repealed, or serving a transition management function even if they are.136 For 
example, marijuana laws, notably those directed at individual consumption, 
contain penalties many consider disproportionate, particularly given rapidly 
shifting societal views on marijuana use and increasing information regarding 
discriminatory enforcement.137 Here, informal latitude in enforcement of 
possession laws would provide the legal system time to incorporate this 
information into a revised statutory scheme without leaving some demographic 
groups to bear the brunt of the problematic regime. If legislative pathologies 
 
130.  See sources cited infra notes 131–135. 
131.  See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An 
Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 983 (2013); Lisa 
Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional 
Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 STAN. L. REV. 725, 755–56 (2014); Shu-Yi Oei & Leigh Osofsky, 
Legislation and Comment: The Making of the § 199A Regulations, 69 EMORY L.J. 209, 217 (2019). 
132.  See, e.g., Stuntz, supra note 54, at 529–33. 
133.  For example, the speed with which the 2017 tax reform was enacted (due in part to political 
process realities) is widely viewed as contributing to errors and problematic provisions. See, e.g., Oei & 
Osofsky, supra note 131, at 211. 
134.  See Oei & Osofsky, supra note 131, at 217–19. 
135.  See Leigh Osofsky, Agency Legislative Fixes, 105 IOWA L. REV. 2107, 2122 (2020). 
136.  Repeated violations of a law may illuminate problems with the law itself and suggest amendment 
or repeal. Thus, some have advised that “impossibility structures” should be used with caution and that 
“conscious inefficiencies,” which allow individuals space to violate the law, should be preserved. See Hartzog, 
supra note 24, at 1791–92 (quoting Michael L. Rich, Should we Make Crime Impossible?, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y, 795, 846–47 (2013)); Rademacher, supra note 25, at 1–20. 
137.  See, e.g., Steven W. Bender, The Colors of Cannabis: Race and Marijuana, 50 U. C. DAVIS L. REV. 689, 
697 (2016). 
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were to ultimately stymie repeal, then slack’s function would be even more 
important. 
An obvious counterargument is that allowing informal nonenforcement 
will create even stronger incentives for legislators to pass bad laws and may 
cause such laws to remain on the books longer since they are infrequently or 
never enforced and hence not salient. But it is empirically uncertain whether 
these dynamics really occur. Time constraints and legislative process realities 
already place significant pressure on legislatures to push imperfect laws through, 
often without understanding their content.138 Moreover, legislative fixes for the 
most part do not happen immediately, if at all.139 This is particularly so if the 
law is not one of broad application.140 For example, rules regarding eligibility 
for the Earned Income Tax Credit or the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s 
Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program (SNAP) by their very nature 
apply to a segment of the population that is not politically powerful.141 If these 
laws are flawed, there may be little legislative impetus to fix them. Simply put, 
if those most capable of making their voices heard are not affected by the law, 
it is unlikely that effective coalitions for repeal will form. 
Finally, because of changing compositions of legislatures and the vote 
trading that inevitably occurs, enacting legislative corrections may simply be 
difficult. Technical corrections of flawed tax legislation are notoriously hard to 
pass.142 Legislators of party A may be unwilling to help party B correct 
legislation that party A had resisted in the first place, or may try to extract 
concessions, leading to gridlock.143 
Whether this “second space” argument proves powerful enough to justify 
the existence of slack depends on factors such as what proportion of laws are 
problematic and whether there are countervailing harms to rule-of-law norms 
and enforcement. In general, we suggest that slack is probably valuable where 
it is unfeasible for legislatures to refrain from passing legislation, where laws, 
once enacted, are difficult to repeal, and where continuing to enforce the law 
until it is repealed may be harmful or unfair to some groups. 
II. THE IMPACT OF DATA ON SLACK 
We now examine data and information’s impact on slack and how this will 
transform the relationship among humans, governments, and the law. Part II.A 
describes the proliferation of increasingly ubiquitous data in society. Part II.B 
 
138.  See sources cited supra note 131. 
139.  See Osofsky, supra note 135, at 2128–29. 
140.  See id. at 2122–23. 
141.  See Oei, Getting More, supra note 126, at 1091 n.81. 
142.  See, e.g., Oei & Osofsky, supra note 131, at 251–52. 
143.  Id. 
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identifies the potential impacts of data on slack in the legal system and the 
implications for design of legal rules. 
In sum, increased data has made human lapses, noncompliance, and 
violations more detectable, traceable, memorable, and thus easier to detect and 
hard to ignore. Accordingly, slack is expected to shrink. But given that increases 
in such data are not uniform, and that some individuals have greater capacities 
to manage their data, shrinkage in slack will likely be uneven and 
disproportionate in impact. 
A. Ubiquitous Data 
In analytics’ parlance, data, information, and insights mean different things. 
Data refers to raw and discrete facts or statistics.144 It becomes useful when it 
can be processed into information that generates usable insights.145 In this 
Article, we use the shorthand “data” to refer to data as well as the information 
and insights it generates. 
The lifecycle view of data that permeates the data management literature 
highlights key phases in data use. These include planning, collection, use, 
storage, and reuse.146 This conceptual breakdown helps illuminate the fact that 
while some ethical and policy considerations run through all phases of the data 
lifecycle, specific considerations may become particularly relevant at each 
different phase. 
Data is found in many places, including government and private databases, 
private emails or communications, and public or semi-public online postings.147 
It takes various forms, including photos, video, and text.148 It is collected when 
humans engage in mundane activities, including going to the doctor, surfing the 
internet, and walking down the street. It is gathered via mechanisms ranging 
from cell phones to hand-filled-out forms.149 Massive amounts of data on the 
ideas, finances, and behaviors of humans and entities are increasingly being 
collected, normalized,150 analyzed, and used for social, economic, and 
 
144.  See generally Brent Dykes, Actionable Insights: The Missing Link Between Data and Business Value, 
FORBES (Apr. 26, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/brentdykes/2016/04/26/actionable-insights-the-
missing-link-between-data-and-business-value/#2f5a28b951e5. 
145.  Id. 
146.  See, e.g., Jeannette M. Wing, The Data Life Cycle, HARV. DATA SCI. REV. (July 1, 2019), 
https://doi.org/10.1162/99608f92.e26845b4. 
147.  Dykes, supra note 144. 
148.  Id. 
149.  Id. 
150.  Normalization means making data into comparable units. See Introduction to Data Normalization, 
AGILE DATA, http://agiledata.org/essays/dataNormalization.html. 
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commercial purposes.151 Data has, in the words of one analyst, become the 
“new oil,” a critical raw material for business, commerce, and government.152 
Owing to the growing hunger for data, human activity is increasingly 
susceptible to being surveilled, often without the subject’s knowledge or 
consent, and there is significant risk that such data will never be “forgotten.”153 
This raises questions about privacy rights in the data age. As an indicator of the 
issue’s importance, the New York Times launched a “Privacy Project” in 2019, 
consisting of a series of articles discussing data and surveillance and evaluating 
the repercussions for privacy.154 Privacy debates aside, ubiquitous data also 
carries critical implications for law’s operation and design, as this Article 
explores. 
The claim of data’s ubiquity is not a claim that until now, we have operated 
in a world of little or no data; rather, it is an acknowledgement of the drastically 
changing scale and scope of data collection and analysis.155 Recognition of this 
tectonic shift has prompted analogies to Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon156 in 
analyzing data-driven dynamics and relationships in society.157 
 
151.  Dykes, supra note 144. See, e.g., Zhijun Chen et al., Data-Driven Mergers and Personalization (Inst. of 
Soc. and Econ. Rsch., Osaka Univ., Discussion Paper No. 1108, 2020), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3725312 (exploring the role of data acquisition in 
prompting merger transactions). 
152.  The World’s Most Valuable Resource is No Longer Oil, But Data, THE ECONOMIST (May 6, 2017), 
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/05/06/the-worlds-most-valuable-resource-is-no-longer-oil-
but-data. The original quote is usually attributed to mathematician Clive Humby. See also José Parra-Moyano, 
Karl Schmedders & Alex Pentland, What Managers Need to Know About Data Exchanges, 61 MIT SLOAN MGMT. 
REV. 39 (2020) (exploring data as a factor of production and how its production is changing). 
153.  Currently there is no systematic path by which data is effectively “forgotten” in the United States. 
See generally Tim Wu, Opinion, How Capitalism Betrayed Privacy, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/10/opinion/sunday/privacy-capitalism.html. A sweeping literature 
examines the theoretical underpinning of a right to be forgotten and the tradeoffs. See, e.g., Urs Gasser et al., 
Internet Monitor 2014: Reflections on the Digital World: Platforms, Policy, Privacy, and Public Discourse (Berkman Center 
Rsch. Publ’n No. 2014-17, 2014), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2538813; 
Giancarlo F. Frosio, The Right to Be Forgotten: Much Ado About Nothing, 15 COLO. TECH. L.J. 307 (2017); Robert 
Kirk Walker, The Right to be Forgotten, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 257 (2012); Stefan Kulk & Frederik Zuiderveen 
Borgesius, Privacy, Freedom of Expression, and the Right to Be Forgotten in Europe, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK 
OF CONSUMER PRIVACY 301 (Jules Polonetsky, Omer Tene & Evan Selinger eds., 2018). 
154.  The Privacy Project, supra note 1; Bill Hanvey, Opinion, Your Car Knows When You Gain Weight, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 20, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/20/opinion/car-repair-data-privacy.html; 
Michael Kwet, Opinion, In Stores, Secret Surveillance Tracks Your Every Move, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/06/14/opinion/bluetooth-wireless-tracking-privacy.html. 
155.  Stuart Thompson & Charlie Warzel, Opinion, Twelve Million Phones, One Data, Zero Privacy, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/12/19/opinion/location-tracking-cell-
phone.html. 
156.  JEREMY BENTHAM, Panopticon, in 4 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 43, 44 (John Bowring ed., 
Russell & Russell 1962) (1838–43). 
157.  See, e.g., Sonia K. Katyal, The New Surveillance, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 297, 317–20 (2003) 
(exploring the Panoptic qualities of cyber peer-to-peer networks); Tjerk Timan, Maša Galič & Bert-Jaap 
Koops, Surveillance Theory and Its Implications for Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW, REGULATION, 
AND TECHNOLOGY 731 (Roger Brownsword, Eloise Scotford & Karen Yeung eds., 2017) (offering an 
overview of surveillance theory and techniques); Julie E. Cohen, Privacy, Visibility, Transparency, and Exposure, 
75 U. CHI. L. REV. 181, 184 (2008) (noting that “[a]cademic privacy theorists have tended to favor the motif 
of the Panopticon” in evaluating the relationship between privacy and visibility); OSCAR H. GANDY, JR., THE 
OEI & RING_EIC REVIEW (DO NOT DELETE) 11/15/2021  11:33 AM 
2021] “Slack” in the Data Age 73 
Four key features of the contemporary data landscape inform data’s 
impacts on slack: 
1. A Wide Range of Topical Categories 
Widespread collection, processing, and use of data take place for at least 
seven different purposes: financial, security, medical, social, commercial, 
political, and regulatory.158 We briefly discuss these in turn. Notably, because 
data is non-rivalrous, multiple actors may derive value from the same data, and 
data collected and processed for one purpose can be used for another.159 In 
fact, how boundaries between uses are managed is an important emerging 
policy issue.160 Thus, our delineation of data’s different purposes in no way 
implies ultimate separation of uses. 
Data has long been used in making financial forecasting decisions.161 Such 
data may be person-specific, such as credit scores, or may consist of broader 
statistics on markets, investments, and debts.162 Financial data is processed by 
humans as well as by algorithms.163 Data sources that are not obviously financial 
in nature may increasingly be used for finance purposes.164 For example, micro-
lender Lenddo uses a cutting-edge algorithm that relies on non-traditional data 
to illuminate “social nuances,” including whether the prospective borrower uses 
one-word subject lines in emails (signaling attention to detail), uses financial 
 
PANOPTIC SORT: A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PERSONAL INFORMATION (1993) (offering a vision of the 
surveillance society); Thomas McMullan, What Does the Panopticon Mean in the Age of Digital Surveillance?, THE 
GUARDIAN (July 23, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/23/panopticon-digital-
surveillance-jeremy-bentham. 
158.  See Thompson & Warzel, supra note 155. 
159.  Data’s non-rivalry has provided the foundation for economic theories regarding ideal property 
rules for data ownership. Charles I. Jones & Christopher Tonetti, Nonrivalry and the Economics of Data, 110 AM. 
ECON. REV. 2819, 2822 (2020). For early studies in the field, see, for example, George Joseph Stigler, The 
Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961); George Joseph Stigler, Information in the Labor Market, 70 
J. POL. ECON. 94 (1962); Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q.J. ECONOMICS 355 (1973). 
160.  Wu, supra note 153 (“[D]ata and surveillance networks created for one purpose can and will be 
used for others.”); Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, Tracking Phones, Google Is a Dragnet for the Police (Apr. 13, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/04/13/us/google-location-tracking-police.html (noting the “if 
you build it, they will come” principle, i.e., “anytime a technology company creates a system that could be 
used in surveillance, law enforcement inevitably comes knocking”); see also Acquisti et al., supra note 22 
(discussing economic theories of privacy). 
161.  Thompson & Warzel, supra note 155. 
162.  Id. 
163.  See, e.g., Robert Bartlett et al., Consumer-Lending Discrimination in the FinTech Era (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 25943, 2019), 
https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w25943/w25943.pdf (examining discrimination in 
algorithmic lending); Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated 
Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2014) (exploring growth, use, and risks of scoring). 
164.  Emily Bary, How Artificial Intelligence Could Replace Credit Scores and Reshape How We Get Loans, 
MARKET WATCH (Oct. 29, 2018), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/ai-based-credit-scores-will-soon-
give-one-billion-people-access-to-banking-services-2018-10-09; see also supra notes 159–160 and 
accompanying text. 
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apps on their smartphone (signaling whether they take finances seriously), and 
has a high ratio of smartphone selfies (signaling youth, and enabling the lender 
to group prospective borrowers).165 Such alternative algorithms are often 
justified on grounds that they open the lending market up to the “unbanked.”166 
The use of these types of metrics will likely become increasingly widespread.167 
Data has also been gathered for security purposes, including for both 
personal safety (home burglar alarms) and public safety (law enforcement, 
antiterrorism, national security, border control, and protection of business 
assets).168 This data may be gathered through surveillance videos, locational 
tracking, and biometric information.169 It may be organized in databases created 
for one purpose, which may then be used for other, perhaps unanticipated, 
purposes.170 For example, the data sources available to U.S. Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (ICE) have expanded and now include driver’s license 
photos, phone records, jail bookings, insurance information, utility bills, social 
media accounts, and tax records.171 
Data has long been at the heart of medicine. Comprehensive medical 
records enable healthcare providers to make patient-care decisions. Personal 
health data plays a critical role in contact tracing and related pandemic-
management measures.172 Large population data sets provide valuable insights 
 
165.  Bary, supra note 164; see also George Popescu, Lenddo—The Google of Lending Algorithms, LENDING 
TIMES (Feb. 29, 2016), https://lending-times.com/2016/02/29/lenddo-the-google-of-lending-algorithms/. 
166.  See Popescu, supra note 165. 
167.  See Bary, supra note 164; Adair Morse & Karen Pence, Technological Innovation and Discrimination in 
Household Finance 2–3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 26739, 2020), 
https://www.nber.org/papers/w26739. 
168.  See, e.g., Glenn S. Gerstell, I Work for N.S.A. We Cannot Afford to Lose the Digital Revolution, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 10, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/10/opinion/nsa-privacy.html; cf. Richards, 
supra note 2, 1936–38. 
169.  See Richards, supra note 2, at 1938–40. 
170.  See Wu, supra note 153. 
171.  McKenzie Funk, How ICE Picks Its Targets in the Surveillance Age, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (June 7, 2021), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/02/magazine/ice-surveillance-deportation.html. 
172.  See, e.g., Karla Grossenbacher, Richard Lutkus & Eric Suits, Workplace Contact Tracing Apps—Legal 
Implications and Considerations, BLOOMBERG LAW (July 2, 2020), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-
week/insight-workplace-contact-tracing-apps-legal-implications-and-considerations; Arshad R. Zargar, 
Privacy, Security Concerns as India Forces Virus-Tracing App on Millions, CBS NEWS (May 27, 2020), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/coronavirus-india-contact-tracing-app-privacy-data-security-concerns-
aarogya-setu-forced-on-millions/; Luis Felipe M. Ramos, Evaluating Privacy During the COVID-19 Public Health 
Emergency: The Case of Facial Recognition Technologies, SSRN (Nov. 13, 2020), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3729470; David O. Argente, Chang-Tai Hsieh & 
Munseob Lee, The Cost of Privacy: Welfare Effects of the Disclosure of COVID-19 Cases, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Rsch., Working Paper No. 27220, 2020), 
https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w27220/w27220.pdf; Mark Findlay et al. Ethics, AI, 
Mass Data and Pandemic Challenges: Responsible Data Use and Infrastructure Application for Surveillance and Pre-emptive 
Tracing Post-Crisis (Sing. Mgmt. Univ. Ctr. for AI & Data Governance, Rsch. Paper No. 2020/02, 2020), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3592283. 
OEI & RING_EIC REVIEW (DO NOT DELETE) 11/15/2021  11:33 AM 
2021] “Slack” in the Data Age 75 
into promising drug and treatment options.173 In the data age, individual and 
population medical data collection and analysis have ramped up exponentially. 
For example, health monitoring devices (e.g., pedometers and heart-rate 
monitors) can generate minute-by-minute data on different dimensions of 
health.174 Online genetic tests have given rise to vast databases of 
information.175 Like financial and security data, health-related data has the 
potential for unexpected cross-uses such as employee monitoring, insurance, 
marketing, and law enforcement.176 In 2018, San Jose police arrested a man for 
murder based in part on data from the victim’s Fitbit, which pinpointed a spike 
in heart rate followed by slowing and finally termination.177 
Perhaps the most universally recognized context in which data has become 
ubiquitous is through online social networking platforms that accumulate and 
track user data and behavior. Data collected may be used by platforms 
themselves (e.g., for advertising), sold to others, or provided to governments.178 
Contractual clauses and privacy policies described in user agreements offer 
limited protection: policies may be unintelligible,179 may not be salient to users, 
may not prevent data theft or illegal use,180 and may not protect users from 
government requests for social media data (e.g., for national security 
purposes).181 
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Patent for It.), N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/01/technology/amazon-
wristband-tracking-privacy.html. 
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TIMES (Oct. 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/03/us/fitbit-murder-arrest.html. Such law 
enforcement use of a Fitbit is not an isolated instance. Id. 
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They Surveil Us, FORBES (Oct. 25, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kalevleetaru/2018/10/25/social-
media-companies-collect-so-much-data-even-they-cant-remember-all-the-ways-they-surveil-
us/?sh=2344aae07d0b; Kalev Leetaru, What Does It Mean for Social Media Platforms to “Sell” Our Data?, FORBES 
(Dec. 15, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kalevleetaru/2018/12/15/what-does-it-mean-for-social-
media-platforms-to-sell-our-data/?sh=58b56d952d6c. 
179.  Kevin Litman-Navarro, Opinion, We Read 150 Privacy Policies. They Were an Incomprehensible Disaster, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/06/12/opinion/facebook-google-
privacy-policies.html. 
180.  See, e.g., Shu-Yi Oei & Diane Ring, Leak-Driven Law, 65 UCLA L. REV. 532, 536–39 (2018); Adam 
B. Thimmesch, Tax Privacy?, 90 TEMP. L. REV. 375, 377–79 (2018). 
181.  See, e.g., Agency Information Collection Activities: Generic Clearance for the Collection of Social 
Media Information on Immigration and Foreign Travel Forms, 84 Fed. Reg. 46557 (proposed Sept. 4, 2019) 
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Data is also used for commercial purposes such as advertising, employee 
monitoring, business strategy, inventory management, and product 
development.182 In some cases, businesses have the data under their control and 
simply need to convert it into usable information and intelligence. In other 
cases, businesses must acquire the data, in which case a market for data may 
develop. Commercial use and acquisition of data may or may not be legal.183 
Data is central to seizing and maintaining political power. Data about 
prospective voters can enable politicians, political parties, and others to 
determine messaging or vote-garnering strategies.184 Such data may be 
combined with other information (e.g., academic research findings) about voter 
behavior to suggest political strategies.185 The political use of data is not limited 
to internal actors in a political system. The use of fake Facebook accounts to 
influence the 2016 U.S. presidential election by parties acting on behalf of the 
Russian government spotlighted how outside actors use data to influence a 
country’s internal politics.186 The political relevance of data is not limited to the 
voting booth: data can be used to determine levels of support for policies and 
may suggest strategies for engagement with various constituencies or with other 
countries.187 More sinisterly, data about political opponents or grassroots 
opposition may be used to quash such opposition, either directly or through 
pretextual means.188 
 
(collecting social media data for border and immigration admissions); Sandra E. Garcia, U.S. Requiring Social 
Media Information from Visa Applicants, N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2019), 
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Zaveri, Harvard Student Says He Was Barred from U.S. Over His Friends’ Social Media Posts, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/27/us/harvard-student-ismail-ajjawi.html; Yoko Kubota, 
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https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-cyber-cop-ups-the-pressure-to-control-online-speech-1542291470 
(requiring online service providers to maintain detailed records of user information); see also Ignacio Cofone, 
Beyond Data Ownership, 43 CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3564480# (arguing protection of privacy rights must 
be achieved through both property and liability rules). 
182.  Yeginsu, supra note 176. 
183.  See Internet Privacy Laws Revealed–How your Personal Information is Protected Online, THOMPSON 
REUTERS, https://legal.thomsonreuters.com/en/insights/articles/how-your-personal-information-is-
protected-online (last visited Sept. 15, 2021). 
184.  Elizabeth Culliford, How Political Campaigns Use Your Data, REUTERS (Oct. 12, 2020), 
https://graphics.reuters.com/USA-ELECTION/DATA-VISUAL/yxmvjjgojvr/. 
185.  See id. 
186.  See, e.g., Lawrence J. Trautman, Governance of the Facebook Privacy Crisis, 20 PITT. J. TECH. LAW & 
POL’Y 41 (2020). 
187.  See Kil Huh, Amber Ivey & Dan Kitson, Opinion, Using Data to Improve Policy Decisions, PEW (Aug. 
14, 2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/about/news-room/opinion/2018/08/13/using-data-to-
improve-policy-decisions. 
188.  See, e.g., Joe Parkinson et. al., Huawei Technicians Helped African Governments Spy on Political Opponents, 
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 15, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/huawei-technicians-helped-african-
governments-spy-on-political-opponents-11565793017; Freek van Gils, Wieland Müller & Jens Prüfer, Big 
Data and Democracy (Tilburg Univ. L. & Econ. Ctr., Discussion Paper No. 2020-003, 2020), 
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Finally, state, local, and national governments collect, demand, maintain, 
and share information to assist with a host of regulatory functions, including 
taxation, welfare benefits, and regulation of markets. Tax law, for example, is 
replete with record keeping and information reporting requirements about 
taxpayers and third parties. Examples include offshore financial asset reporting, 
multinational cross-border reporting, employee withholding, and property tax 
databases.189 More recently, governments have also used data to score both 
people and businesses on a wide range of metrics.190 In some cases, stringent 
rules may restrict access and sharing of data, such as rules protecting tax return 
data.191 But in other contexts, there is evidence that information accumulated 
for one government function has been used for an unrelated one, such as use 
of driver’s license databases by ICE.192 
It cannot be emphasized enough that data collected for one objective may 
be sold, shared, or used for other purposes.193 As the information-economics 
literature has recognized, the same information can mean very different things 
to different actors (e.g., a Facebook post seen by a friend as opposed to ICE), 
the value of information can change over time (e.g., Trump’s tax return 
information before and after he became President), and perhaps most 
powerfully, “the value and sensitivity of one piece of personal information will 
change depending on the other pieces of data with which it can be 
combined.”194 Secondary uses of data may be more widespread than primary 
uses, a point reflected in the final “dissemination” step of the life cycle of data 
concept.195 
As recognized by the information economics literature, data’s nonrival 
character—particularly in light of digitization and the increasing efficiencies 
that data can generate in combination with other data sources—renders the 
 
189.  See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §§ 1471–1474 (FATCA provisions), 26 U.S.C. § 6041 (information reporting); 
26 U.S.C. § 3402 (employee withholding). 
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Ranking, and Assessment, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF ALGORITHMS 632 (Woodrow Barfield 
& Ugo Pagallo eds., 2020); John Butcher, China to Companies: Show Tax Compliance or Risk Punishment, 
BLOOMBERG TAX (Dec. 19, 2018), https://news.bloombergtax.com/daily-tax-report-international/china-
to-companies-show-tax-compliance-or-risk-punishment (detailing China’s tax portion of its “social credit 
system”). 
191.  See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 6103. 
192.  Catie Edmondson, ICE Used Facial Recognition to Mine State Driver’s License Databases, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/07/us/politics/ice-drivers-licenses-facial-
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12, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3394979 
(explaining secondary use decisions are made without reference to original consumer); see, e.g., Adam B. 
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194.  See Acquisti et al., supra note 22, at 447. 
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issue of secondary uses absolutely critical.196 The potential for secondary use, 
paired with law’s reticence in proscribing such uses, transforms widely available 
data into truly ubiquitous data. That is, if rights to use and share data are 
expansive and data is nonrival, then the commercial interest in acquiring vast 
quantities of data will undoubtedly grow, particularly as processing capabilities 
increase. 
2. Myriad Collectors 
Data is collected, stored, used, and reused by different actors including 
governments, businesses, and individuals. Different actors have distinctive 
advantages and disadvantages with respect to data. Governments may demand 
data by law, for example, accumulating data through census taking, tax and 
immigration records, or surveillance.197 Governments may also require that data 
be turned over by private actors like Facebook, Google, or counterparties to 
business transactions.198 
Businesses have different advantages. They can condition access to goods, 
services, or employment on provision of data and can obscure how such data 
is collected and used.199 Businesses “request” data by linking it to discounts or 
other benefits.200 Websites use cookies to hold and store data, which may be 
 
196.  Some strands of information economics advocate designing data rights to expand the ability to 
create, use, and disseminate data, and to generate increased efficiencies. See, e.g., Jones & Tonetti, supra note 
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(2017), https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/country-by-country-reporting-handbook-on-effective-tax-risk-
assessment.pdf. CbC reporting has been adopted by ninety countries and requires multinational corporations 
to provide certain data for each country in which they operate. Action 13 Country-by-Country Reporting, ORG. 
FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/beps-actions/action13/ (last visited Sept. 28, 
2021); see also Signatories of the Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement on the Exchange of Country-by-Country 
Reports (CbC MCAA) and Signing Dates, ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/CbC-MCAA-Signatories.pdf (last updated Aug. 12, 2021). 
198.  See Government Requests for User Data, FACEBOOK TRANSPARENCY CENTER, 
https://transparency.fb.com/data/government-data-requests/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2021); Alfred Ng, Google 
Reports All-Time High of Government Data Requests, CNET (Sept. 28, 2017), 
https://www.cnet.com/tech/services-and-software/google-reports-all-time-high-of-government-data-
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199.  See, e.g., Yeginsu, supra note 176. 
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Discounts, INSIDER (Mar. 18, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/financial-service-consumers-share-
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used for advertising and other purposes.201 While cookie use is now usually 
disclosed, options to decline remain limited.202 
Individuals—with the help of digital technologies, the internet, and social 
media platforms—also have increasing ability to disseminate, access, and 
analyze data, both about themselves and others.203 In the digital age, individuals 
can easily disseminate both contemporary and historic information about 
others through online reviews, social media shaming, and “internet 
vigilantism.”204 While individual actors have less ability to demand provision or 
maintenance of data than governments or businesses, they may be less 
constrained and more erratic in using data once obtained.205 
3. Changing Uses 
Another important point is that uses of data are changing, spurred by the 
growing ease with which data can be accessed and analyzed and by 
improvements in available technologies. Data analytics is, for example, 
transforming how policing is done and how national security surveillance is 
performed.206 Data analytics is also transforming tax administration.207 
Although the IRS has long relied on data-driven methods to identify audit 
targets (including its famous Discriminate Inventory Function (DIF) score 
originating in the 1960s), new technologies are enabling it to move its data use 
to a new level.208 The IRS’s commitment to building capacity and using data 
analytics in tax administration is evidenced by its formation of the Research, 
Applied Analytics, and Statistics Division in November 2016.209 Businesses can 
also process and analyze data in unanticipated ways, as the Lenddo example 
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https://www.osano.com/articles/cookie-consent-requirements. 
203.  See, e.g., Kevin Roose, A Machine May Not Take Your Job, But One Could Become Your Boss, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/23/technology/artificial-intelligence-ai-
workplace.html (detailing ways in which AI “make[s] workers more effective by giving them real-time 
feedback” on their performance). 
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https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/14/opinion/china-privacy.html. 
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(Aug. 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/30/technology/doxxing-protests.html. 
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Selection, BLOOMBERG TAX (June 5, 2019), https://news.bloombergtax.com/daily-tax-report/insight-
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reveals,210 and may hold funding and technological advantages over 
governments in acquiring and working with evolving types and quantities of 
data. 
An important new frontier in how data is used is machine learning, in which 
computers are fed large quantities of training data selected via mathematical 
models in order to learn to perform tasks.211 This enables computers to learn 
automatically, without human intervention or instruction, and to do tasks such 
as filtering spam email, image recognition, targeted advertising, and medical 
diagnosis.212 Machine learning enhances our capacity to improve behavior, 
detect and prove criminal conduct, and predict who will be the next criminal, 
tortfeasor, or tax evader.213 It also has the capacity to change law. For example, 
the computational-law movement asks, as its organizing questions, whether 
artificial intelligence and machines can replace judicial decision-making and 
whether “legal singularity,” in which law becomes increasingly perfectly 
specified, can be reached.214 The rapid rise in algorithm use across many fields 
has instigated questions about the risks of algorithmic decision-making given 
that underlying data may be inaccurate, and that both data and algorithms may 
reflect racial or other biases.215 The answers to these questions will become ever 
more crucial as direct human decision-making decreases and algorithmic 
decision-making increases. 
There are other, related uses of data. As noted, technologies and 
products—such as cars with maximum speed limits—can now be designed to 
make unlawful or ill-advised behaviors impossible, and such technologies 
necessarily rely on data and information to operate.216 In the political sphere, 
social media platforms have been used to manipulate voter attitudes and 
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216.  See sources cited supra note 24. 
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preferences and to sow misinformation.217 In business, misinformation is 
increasingly used to market products and influence consumer preferences, and 
“disinformation for hire” public relations firms can be engaged to sow 
misinformation.218 These technologies and uses are ever changing and 
becoming more sophisticated.219 
The evolving uses of data open up many possibilities for more efficient and 
effective regulation and enforcement of law, and with it, declining space for 
slack. But this trend carries risks, including the risk of algorithmic 
discrimination, risks to individual self-determination, and risks to democracy. 
The speed and likelihood of changing uses means that the evaluation of data’s 
benefits and risks is an evolving, yet increasingly critical, exercise. 
4. Changing Methods of Collection 
How data is collected is also changing. For one thing, even when individuals 
do not actively surrender data, “big data” technologies allow inferences to be 
made based on the behaviors of those around them.220 For example, Facebook 
can garner information about a person, even if they never post or are not a user, 
by compiling information distilled from their social circle.221 This ability to lose 
privacy and control over one’s data through social links has been described as 
“privacy dependencies,”222 a reality that complicates efforts to protect data 
rights, privacy, and access. 
Data can also increasingly be obtained illegally, such as through hacks and 
leaks.223 Legitimately collected data that is hacked or leaked may become subject 
to illegitimate uses224 but may also help with law enforcement, as we have 
described in previous work.225 Current data protection regimes, such as 
 
217.  Craig Silverman, Jane Lytvynenko & William Kung, Disinformation for Hire: How a New Breed of PR 
Firms Is Selling Lies Online, BUZZFEED NEWS (Jan. 6, 2020), 
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/craigsilverman/disinformation-for-hire-black-pr-firms. 
218.  Id. 
219.  See Trautman, supra note 186; Matthew Rosenberg, Nicole Perlroth & David E. Sanger, ‘Chaos Is 
the Point’: Russian Hackers and Trolls Grow Stealthier in 2020, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/10/us/politics/russia-hacking-disinformation-election.html. 
220.  See Zeynep Tufekci, Think You’re Discreet Online? Think Again, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/21/opinion/computational-inference.html. 
221.  Id. 
222.  Solon Barocas & Karen Levy, Privacy Dependencies, 95 WASH. L. REV. 555, 555 (2020) (articulating 
how “our privacy depends on the decisions and disclosure of other people”); see also Zraick & Zaveri, supra 
note 181 (discussing a Harvard student denied entry to the United States based on friends’ social media posts). 
223.  See, e.g., David S. Wall, How Big Data Feeds Big Crime, 117 CURRENT HIST. 29 (2018); Michael 
Hatfield, Cybersecurity and Tax Reform, 93 IND. L.J. 1161 (2018). 
224.  See, e.g., Jeb Su, Data Breach Alert: Over 1 Million Credit Card Data from the U.S., South Korea Have Been 
Leaked, FORBES (Aug. 5, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeanbaptiste/2019/08/05/data-leak-alert-
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fiduciary obligations on data custodians, have proven insufficient to protect 
against illegal transmission. 
B. Data’s Potential Impacts on Slack 
Given the complex data landscape, it is not surprising that the national 
conversation about data has underscored both its benefits (such as increased 
security)226 and its negative effects (such as bias, compromised privacy, and 
excessive surveillance).227 We now examine how data affects slack in the legal 
system. The upshot is that just as slack itself is a mixed bag, data may have 
positive effects on the allocation of slack but also carries risks. 
1. Less Slack 
Data has made human missteps more detectable, traceable, memorable, and 
subject to monitoring. This shift has put pressure on slack, particularly slack 
originating in information imperfections. Perhaps most problematically, 
increasingly available data makes it easier to enforce unjust or out-of-step 
laws.228 But data also affects other types of slack, for example, by casting 
sunshine on politically driven or mercy driven slack. 
At the risk of stating the obvious, it is worth explicitly delineating the 
mechanisms through which data reduces slack. First, digitization has created 
greater capacity to store, transfer, and steal information. Second, data is 
nonrival.229 Thus, various actors are collecting large quantities of data, much of 
which is tangential to their own interests, on the theory that such data can be 
resold and used by others. Third, data can be integrated into new artificial 
intelligence and algorithmic systems to generate predictions and insights.230 The 
ability of intelligent machines and algorithmic systems to process data, generate 
insights, and suggest responses means that consequences for actions, inactions, 
or mere possession of personal characteristics may occur more swiftly.231  
Fourth, law often permits data sharing, or is powerless to stop it.232 The end 
 
226.  See, e.g., James O’Neill, How Facial Recognition Makes You Safer, N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/09/opinion/facial-recognition-police-new-york-city.html; Gerstell, 
supra note 168. 
227.  See, e.g., Richards, supra note 2; Harmon, supra note 19. 
228.  See, e.g., Will Douglas Heaven, Predictive Policing Algorithms Are Racist. They Need to Be Dismantled, 
MIT TECH. REV. (July 17, 2020), https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/07/17/1005396/predictive-
policing-algorithms-racist-dismantled-machine-learning-bias-criminal-justice/. Of course, extremely weird 
laws that are not very consequential are unlikely to become more enforced after data. 
229.  Acquisti et al., supra note 22, at 446. 
230.  See Brayne, supra note 11, at 981. 
231.  See sources cited supra notes 206–215 and accompanying text. 
232.  See generally Nuala O’Connor, Reforming the U.S. Approach to Data Protection and Privacy, COUNCIL 
ON FOREIGN RELS. (Jan 30, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/report/reforming-us-approach-data-protection 
(describing the U.S. as having “only a patchwork of sector-specific laws”). 
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result is that information about imperfect behaviors is more likely to be detected 
and processed and is more likely to generate consequences. 
Some real-world examples add texture. Social media sites contain vast 
quantities of digitized information. This allows authorities to use this 
information for law enforcement, as recent examples from tax and immigration 
attest.233 Other sources of digitized information can be used for various 
purposes: a Washington Post story recently described how ICE uses facial 
recognition technology to search state driver’s license photos for 
undocumented immigrants.234 We now know that the Department of 
Homeland Security is using cellphone location data purchased from a 
commercial vendor for immigration enforcement.235 Searchable health and 
financial records can be used to prove false claims to insurers or lenders.236 
Mobile phone location technologies allow law enforcement to use location 
information to monitor and sanction.237 Data from personal activity trackers 
can provide evidence to convict persons of a crime.238 The use of big data in 
policing has effectively amplified surveillance activities, lowered thresholds for 
inclusion in enforcement databases, and drawn increasing numbers of 
individuals into the surveillance net.239 On a micro level, nontraditional 
algorithms employed by governments or businesses such as Lenddo240 mean 
that personal traits or shortcomings can now have legal and economic 
repercussions (such as being turned down for loans).241 
These examples illustrate how a combination of digitizable, monetizable, 
and transferable information—which can be used by human enforcers or fed 
 
233.  See Rohrlich, supra note 207 (describing IRS monitoring of social media sites to detect 
noncompliance); Zraick & Zaveri, supra note 181 (describing immigration enforcement using social media 
information). 
234.  Drew Harwell, FBI, ICE Find State Driver’s License Photos are a Gold Mine for Facial-Recognition Searches, 
WASH. POST (July 7, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/07/07/fbi-ice-find-state-
drivers-license-photos-are-gold-mine-facial-recognition-searches/. 
235.  Byron Tau & Michelle Hackman, Federal Agencies Use Cellphone Location Data for Immigration 
Enforcement, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 7, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/federal-agencies-use-cellphone-
location-data-for-immigration-enforcement-11581078600?mod=hp_lead_pos5. 
236.  Trevor Lloyd-Jones, The Power of Analytics for Insurance Fraud Detection, LEXISNEXIS (Apr. 4, 2018), 
https://blogs.lexisnexis.com/insurance-insights/2018/04/the-power-of-analytics-for-insurance-fraud-
detection/. 
237.  Valentino-DeVries, supra note 160. 
238.  See, e.g., Hauser, supra note 177 (describing police reliance on victim’s Fitbit to document time of 
murder and presence of accused); Christine Hauser, In Connecticut Murder Case, a Fitbit Is a Silent Witness, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/27/nyregion/in-connecticut-murder-case-a-
fitbit-is-a-silent-witness.html (noting Fitbit data contradicted husband’s claim that intruders broke into their 
home and tied him up and shot his wife). 
239.  Brayne, supra note 11, at 985. 
240.  See, e.g., Michal Gromek, Social Scoring in Finance: We are Partly Already There, FORBES (July 25, 2018), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/michalgromek/2018/07/25/social-scoring-in-finance-we-are-partly-
already-there/#4fde589760bd. 
241.  See Bary, supra note 164. 
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to machine enforcers242 and whose transfer is allowed by law—has led to more 
pressure on slack, whether in the form of punishment, exclusion from benefits 
or protections, increased surveillance, or more stringent terms of engagement. 
As data collection, processing, transfer, and usage become more prevalent, this 
pressure is likely to increase. 
2. Inconsistent Impacts of Data on Slack 
Data has become increasingly ubiquitous through a gradual and uneven 
process. Some types of information are generated more quickly, and some 
technologies will take hold more rapidly than others. This suggests that the 
impacts of data on slack will be inconsistent, particularly with respect to pockets 
of slack stemming from information imperfections. The following are some of 
the likely disparities. 
Sophisticated Actors. Contraction of slack is likely occurring in a way that 
favors sophisticated actors. Those who understand how their data is accessed 
and what steps they can take to protect or hide it may better resist slack’s 
contraction.243 From a life cycle of data perspective,244 there are several points 
where sophisticated actors with more knowledge, power, or resources can 
minimize the flow of their data. Most obviously, they can better prevent 
acquisition but may also be better equipped to stop any sharing or repurposing 
of their data and may even have the capacity to withdraw data from the pool.245 
Conversely, data trails left by less sophisticated actors may be low-hanging fruit, 
readily available to enforcers. Particularly in the now-pervasive situation where 
agencies are resource constrained, such data risks being used immediately to 
sort, monitor, and sanction more efficiently.246 The confluence of resource-
constrained agencies and differences in data trails can amplify disparities in the 
contraction of slack. 
Uneven contraction of slack across different populations is troubling, 
particularly to the extent that sophistication correlates with factors such as race, 
class, or socioeconomic status.247 It would be one thing if it could be shown 
that unsophisticated actors were previously accorded disproportionate amounts 
 
242.  See, e.g., Rashida Richardson et al., Dirty Data, Bad Predictions: How Civil Rights Violations Impact Police 
Data, Predictive Policing Systems, and Justice, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 15 (2019); Albert Meijer & Martijin 
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95 WASH. U. L. REV. 53 (2017); Michele Estrin Gilman, The Class Differential in Privacy Law, 77 BROOK. L. 
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PRIVACY 198 (Evan Salinger, Jules Polonetsky & Omer Tene eds., 2018). 
244.  See generally Wing, supra note 146. 
245.  See Madden et al., supra note 243, at 64–67. 
246.  Mary Madden, The Devastating Consequences of Being Poor in the Digital Age, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/25/opinion/privacy-poverty.html. 
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of slack and data is now recalibrating the balance. But, in fact, the reverse is 
more likely.248 
Government and Institutional Actors. Institutional actors, such as corporations, 
platforms, and governments, may be better positioned to access and process 
data than individuals who are data subjects. This raises not just privacy issues 
but has real consequences for slack.249 Individuals may not fully appreciate how 
institutional actors collect and use their data and what legal ramifications this 
may hold for the future. 
One important reason why institutional actors may hold advantages over 
individuals relates to eroding practical constraints. While government and 
institutional actors have long had access to data, they have confronted 
technological limitations, such as the limited digitalization of data.250 But these 
limitations are disappearing. Another structural reason stems from the 
emergence of active data marketplaces that operate in an environment with 
relatively few legal constraints.251 Institutional actors have more ability than 
individuals to participate in these marketplaces as buyers and sellers of data.252 
Targeting and Bias. To the extent governments, institutional actors, and 
private-sector actors interact selectively and unevenly with different 
demographic groups or choose to enforce unjust laws, the diminishing slack 
that accompanies ubiquitous data will compound problems for those 
constituencies. Governments are powerful aggregators and users of data, 
deploying it to conduct immigration, law enforcement, and other functions.253 
And, it is well recognized that government agencies (including police 
departments) may disproportionately target some racial groups, may set 
enforcement priorities that have the indirect effect of targeting, or may 
selectively pursue enforcement of overbroad laws.254 If data enables targeting 
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251.  See David Tang et al., Value of Data: The Dawn of the Data Marketplace, ACCENTURE (Sept. 7, 2018), 
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Asymmetries: Access to Data in the Criminal Justice System, 68 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 212 (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript 
at 18–20), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3428607 (comparing governments’ and defendants’ abilities to 
demand evidence from third-parties in criminal cases). 
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to be done more easily, the latitude available to targeted groups will shrink, 
particularly if that group is less able to withdraw from the dragnet. 
Take, for example, ICE’s use of facial recognition technologies to mine 
state driver’s license databases for undocumented immigrants.255 This is the first 
known instance of facial recognition technology use on these databases,256 and 
it creates two types of uneven impacts. First, undocumented immigrants as a 
group are being targeted, and the targeting is now more effective due to 
technology, so available slack will shrink for them. Second, facial recognition 
technologies are not perfect, and their biases, which include greater likelihood 
of misidentifying people of color, are increasingly appreciated.257 Thus, 
government use of data to enforce the law against undocumented immigrants 
also creates disproportionate risks for other groups (here, misidentified 
individuals and people of color).258 
Another example comes from tax. In 2010, the U.S. passed the Foreign 
Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) and tightened enforcement of the 
longstanding foreign bank account reporting (FBAR) rules.259 These rules are 
aimed at deterring offshore tax evasion by increasing reporting of foreign 
financial asset information (e.g., bank accounts) to the government and 
tightening up enforcement.260 As a result, a taxpayer’s failure to report the 
existence of a foreign financial asset is now subject to extremely high 
penalties.261 Although the motivation behind these initiatives was tax evasion 
by wealthy Americans, there is increasing recognition that these regimes have 
also affected immigrants in the U.S. and Americans living abroad.262 The latter 
individuals, who have lives and connections in other countries, are now also 
subject to onerous U.S. tax and financial reporting regimes and penalties (albeit 
with some attenuation for those living abroad).263 Moreover, they may have less 
access to good tax advice and less ability to minimize their risks by ceasing to 
hold assets offshore. Thus, FATCA is a case of how even a well-intentioned 
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125 (criticizing IRS Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program penalties as being applied regressively); NAT’L 
TAXPAYER ADVOC., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 400–02 (2018) (citing equity concerns with FBAR 
penalties). 
263.  26 C.F.R. § 1.6038D-2(a)(3) (2016). 
OEI & RING_EIC REVIEW (DO NOT DELETE) 11/15/2021  11:33 AM 
2021] “Slack” in the Data Age 87 
law aimed at improving enforcement through increased data gathering may 
inadvertently create unintended and unfair impacts. 
Foreign Actors. Data may also help aggressive states and actors. As the 2016 
presidential election revealed, actors beyond a nation’s borders can successfully 
gather and manipulate domestically collected data.264 This poses not only 
privacy risks but risks to fair elections, democratic processes, and political 
stability. The risks are not purely domestic. If foreign actors (potentially subject 
to fewer legal constraints and oversight) can comprehensively collect data on 
U.S. individuals and organizations, then U.S. actors may find themselves 
targeted in enforcement actions abroad. In short, the rise of data and the 
contraction of slack may allow aggressive state and institutional actors to 
weaponize their legal systems against subjects from other countries. 
There is also the risk of foreign actors strategically using data they have 
collected to force prosecutions or enforcement actions in the United States. For 
example, a foreign actor could acquire data (legally or illegally), mine it to 
develop a case against U.S. individuals or businesses, and then advocate for 
enforcement by U.S. authorities by using the press or political channels. Even 
if the case has merit, the potential use of data to selectively pressure U.S. 
authorities into action should raise concerns. Moreover, there is no guarantee 
that such data is accurate. Past data leaks have demonstrated that data can be 
falsified.265 False information can be fact checked, but only after significant 
disruption, loss of reputation, and expenditure of resources.266 
Structurally speaking, the power of aggressive foreign actors stems from 
the difficulty of containing data within national borders. States have attempted 
to do so—for example, the European Union has engaged in continual efforts 
to control data accessible both in and outside the European Union—but it is 
unclear how successful these efforts will be.267 
3. The Limits of Sunshine and Scrutiny 
As outlined in Part I.B, sometimes slack stems from politically motivated 
nonenforcement decisions, while other times it arises from resource constraints 
(which can reflect deliberate and nondeliberate elements). Data can cast 
sunshine on these decisions by alerting observers to slack’s existence. For 
example, the 2010 enactment of FATCA268 and the introduction of similar tax 
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26, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/russia-trump-and-2016-us-election. 
265.  Oei & Ring, supra note 180, at 578. 
266.  See id. 
267.  Case C-18/18, Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook Ir., ECLI:EU:C:2019:821 (Oct. 3, 2019) (ruling 
that countries can force Facebook to take down posts not only in their own country but abroad); see also Paul 
M. Schwartz & Karl-Nikolaus Peifer, Transatlantic Data Privacy Law, 106 GEO. L.J. 115, 138-147 (2017). 
268.  See supra notes 259–262 and accompanying text. 
OEI & RING_EIC REVIEW (DO NOT DELETE) 11/15/2021  11:33 AM 
88 ALABAMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:1:47 
information transparency initiatives in other countries were motivated in part 
by whistleblower complaints and data leaks,269 which allowed investigative 
journalists to expose sophisticated or politically connected taxpayers who were 
not held accountable by tax authorities.270 This publicity effectively spurred the 
U.S. and other countries to act. 
The increasing visibility of nonenforcement (particularly where it occurs 
disparately) may help increase accountability. However, sunshine may not be 
sufficient to combat inconsistent allocation and contraction of slack across 
populations.271 Even with more data, the public’s ability to monitor government 
enforcement practices will likely remain outpaced by the ability of enforcers to 
act quickly and the ability of sophisticated actors to hide their noncompliance. 
Sunshine may ultimately subject problematic data uses and enforcement choices 
to scrutiny, but there will inevitably be transition periods where governments 
and sophisticated actors have a first-mover advantage. Moreover, while the 
enforcement harms grounded in digital data are generally experienced by targets 
immediately, the remedial effects of data-driven sunshine on troubling 
enforcement practices can take much longer; sunshine must give rise to outrage 
that in turn triggers action, while enforcement is direct action.272 Thus, 
increased scrutiny of government data use may be of limited value. 
4. New Versions of Targeted Enforcement 
Increasing access to data may generate new methods of targeted 
enforcement and greater opportunities to achieve it. For example, machine 
learning is giving rise to increased surveillance and new methods of 
enforcement such as predictive policing.273 To the extent that machine-learning 
algorithms that monitor or predict behavior are written using data inputs, 
human biases may shape those algorithms.274 As data is fed to machines that 
spit out decisions, discriminatory impacts may persist and disseminate, and 
unfair targeting may result. Under-resourced agencies may be particularly 
motivated to find low-cost ways of using data algorithmically to target 
enforcement, which exacerbates the risk of unjust outcomes. 
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Importantly, even if enforcement is not undertaken, the possession of data 
and the ability to share and use it changes the power dynamics and relationships 
among various actors. For example, even if the government does not use all 
data in its possession, the fact that it possesses the data at all may serve as a 
bargaining chip over individual and firm behavior. This alters trust 
relationships, power dynamics, and social and economic interactions between 
government and the governed. 
5. Changing and Directing Individual Conduct 
Increasingly available data also gives individuals and other actors more 
information about the consequences of their actions. From cars that monitor 
driver reaction times275 to portable breathalyzers to fitness trackers to financial 
monitoring apps, there are diverse ways to evaluate human conduct in real time 
and suggest corrective action. This has prompted some scholars to suggest that 
the era of personalized law, in which human behavior can be regulated via 
microdirectives, is upon us.276 
The development of these data capabilities holds important consequences. 
First, the impacts of such technologies will likely vary based on factors like age 
or technological sophistication; some individuals will not be adept at 
interpreting data or acting on it, so it is highly unlikely that everyone will 
suddenly start behaving perfectly. Second, the availability of more information 
may actually cause some to put more effort into hiding, not eliminating, bad 
behaviors.277 Finally, data will probably not change individual behaviors with 
respect to patently out-of-step or outdated laws. 
If one persists in behaving badly despite data-based technologies that direct 
or suggest otherwise, this may eventually be viewed as deliberate bad intent, 
which may be used to justify harsher ex post consequences.278 For example, if 
one persists in smoking and failing to exercise even after health trackers warn 
of poor health, we could envision this data being used by insurers to deny 
coverage or raise rates or by politicians to justify denial of public benefits based 
on individual responsibility arguments. A potential long-term outcome is that 
we may see less bad behavior (or more hiding of it) but harsher judgment of 
those who do behave poorly. Here too, there may be disparities and uneven 
impacts. 
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6. Calling Law’s Design into Question 
Ultimately, ubiquitous data may call the design and legitimacy of existing 
laws into question. Imagine a city that requires dog owners to register their dogs 
for a $50 fee, and whose laws provide that an owner of an unregistered dog will 
be fined $5,000 for each failure to register. This fine is severe in relation to the 
registration fee. Assuming that it is difficult to get information about each dog 
within the city limits, the hefty fine might have been imposed to deter 
nonregistration. The hope is that rational dog owners will weigh the probability 
of detection (low) against the magnitude of the fine (high) and register the 
dog.279 Now assume that technology develops that can detect the location of 
every dog and transmit that information to the city. The city can now issue 
tickets on a mass scale to fine owners of unregistered dogs. If this were to 
happen, we might now view the $5,000 fine as too harsh. The newly available 
dog-location data arguably transforms a high penalty designed to deter 
nonregistration given low detection probabilities into one that is too draconian 
now that detection is much easier.280 
Statutory and regulatory penalties aside, increased information may also 
have implications for the design and computation of court-awarded damages. 
For example, if increased information enables judges to more accurately assess 
appropriate monetary damages, this could increase the efficiency of awarding 
damages over injunctions, upending conventional wisdom regarding optimal 
design of legal regimes.281 
Data may also call into question the use of ex post remedies. Take for 
example, bankruptcy, which offers a way to manage financial distress. 
Bankruptcy law traditionally comes into play after a debtor has experienced 
financial distress and now seeks a debt discharge. In a world of imperfect 
information, ex post remedies like bankruptcy or bailout may seem the best and 
perhaps only way to deal with financial misfortune. It is difficult to detect bad 
decisions or consumption shocks on the front end, so we discharge debts on 
the back end. As data becomes more ubiquitous, however, lenders and 
regulators may have more ability to predict, observe, and evaluate individual 
financial choices in real time. It may become possible to employ measures to 
identify those on the verge of financial distress and prevent financial distress 
before it occurs. With more information, regulators could use borrowing 
restrictions, targeted income supplements, or financial counseling to help 
borrowers avert financial meltdown ex ante, rather than managing it ex post. 
 
279.  See generally Becker, supra note 7. 
280.  Cf. Price, supra note 17, at 1146. 
281.  See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: 
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972); cf. Brian Galle & Murat Mungan, Predictable 
Punishments, 11 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 337, 337 (2021) (suggesting regulators should rely on punishments that 
remain accurate even when information is limited). 
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The above are just a few examples of how data may change our views of 
law and its optimal design. The broader observation is that increased data may 
lead us to identify necessary adjustments to legal rules, including different 
remedies, penalties, and regulatory approaches. Such adjustments are not 
merely technical. Rather, they raise moral and ethical questions, and may 
transform relationships among humans, governments, and the law.282 
III. MANAGING SLACK IN THE DATA AGE 
So far, this Article has explained how slack arises in the legal system, has 
presented a bounded defense of its importance while acknowledging its risks, 
and has revealed how increasingly ubiquitous data is reshaping slack and likely 
causing it to contract disparately for different populations along the lines of 
race, political power, and sophistication. Specifically, the worry is that some 
populations are likely to become low-hanging enforcement targets, while 
institutional and more aggressive data users will probably come out ahead.283 
This is particularly concerning because unjust laws may become easier to 
enforce. Furthermore, the increased sunshine that comes with data will likely 
be insufficient to fully alleviate any of these problems. 
In short, this Article has demonstrated a fundamental tension: slack is 
valuable, but is sometimes problematic, and the reshaping of slack that 
accompanies data is also sometimes valuable but sometimes problematic. The 
question, then, is how to juggle this tension in managing the interplay between 
slack and data. This Part articulates a framework for managing the slack–data 
relationship and suggests concrete policy solutions. 
A. Managing the Slack-Data Relationship 
We start with a basic, relatively straightforward framework. We then 
explore its limitations and offer cautions. 
1. A Seemingly Obvious Four-Part Framework 
The tensions inherent in the interplay between slack and data suggest four 
seemingly obvious guiding principles. First, data should be used to deal with 
serious problems created by information constraints and the slack that results. 
Data should certainly be used to help solve serious crimes (such as murder) and 
to illuminate instances of unfair and differential enforcement and unjustified 
exercises of mercy (such as failure to hold privileged groups accountable). 
 
282.  See Roger Brownsword & Alon Harel, Editorial, Law, Liberty, and Technology: Criminal Justice in the 
Context of Smart Machines, 15 INT’L J.L. CONTEXT 107, 111–12 (2019) (noting potential changes in regulatory 
signaling effects on community moral aspirations). 
283.  Brayne, supra note 11, at 1003–04. 
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Second, we should avoid using data in ways that diminish slack in cases 
where it is valuable. Thus, we should resist using data to enforce unjust, out-of-
step, or controversial laws (such as marijuana prohibitions), and should evaluate 
such uses carefully.284 Likewise, we should guard against uses of data by legal 
regimes that engage in human rights abuses or targeting of political and other 
minorities, or that have weak rule-of-law values. We should also be less inclined 
to use data in ways that eliminate slack where the law contains poorly attenuated 
sanctions (e.g., draconian penalties) and does not already contain formal 
equitable or leniency provisions or both.285 Conversely, we should be more 
amenable to using data to enforce laws that do have well-attenuated formal 
mechanisms providing flexibility and that are proportionate and well-designed. 
Third, care should be taken to use data fairly. Thus, if data and information 
become available and can help solve serious crimes, then presumably that data 
should be used, absent offsetting considerations. But we should ensure that data 
is not used in ways that produce discriminatory impacts. For example, when 
using facial recognition technology to prevent or solve crimes, we should ensure 
that the technology is not biased and is not used in discriminatory ways.286 
Finally, as data increases, the design of the law should be revisited. For 
example, if probabilities of detection rise significantly due to data, then we 
should consider lowering existing penalties and sanctions.287 If data makes it 
possible, perhaps the law should move towards nudging people ex ante rather 
than punishing them ex post. 
2. Problematizing the Framework 
This basic framework may seem like a relatively clear articulation of how to 
manage the relationship between slack and data, at least in principle. However, 
there are a number of complications and objections. 
First, it may not be clear whether a given instance of slack is problematic 
or valuable. In some cases (for example, laws regarding marijuana possession) 
people may disagree. Relatedly, whether an instance of slack is valuable or 
problematic may change over time as conditions change. For example, it may 
 
284.  Historical examples include slave-ownership laws, laws prohibiting persons of Chinese origin 
from immigrating, laws prohibiting interracial marriage, and laws criminalizing homosexual conduct. See, e.g., 
Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, Pub. L. No. 47-126, 22 Stat. 58; Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, 9 Stat. 462, 
repealed by Fugitive Slave Act of 1864, 13 Stat. 200. 
285.  Laws with draconian sanctions include some tax provisions (such as the penalties for undeclared 
foreign financial assets) and drug sentencing. See, e.g., NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC., ANNUAL REPORT TO 
CONGRESS, supra note 262; Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (to be codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.) (eliminating mandatory five-year sentence for crack cocaine 
to reduce disparity with penalties for powder cocaine); Kyle Graham, Sorry Seems to be the Hardest Word: The 
Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Crack, and Methamphetamine, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 765, 770 (2010). 
286.  See Lohr, supra note 257. 
287.  See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law, in 1 
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 403, 407–20 (Polinsky & Shavell eds., 2006). 
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depend on political conditions, the state of democracy, the strength of rule-of-
law values, or the existence of a global pandemic. 
Second, there may be mixed cases. There may be situations where the crime 
is serious and slack is a problem, but data can only be used in a way that is likely 
to give rise to disparities (e.g., due to technology limitations) or where the 
distributive fallout is uncertain or unknowable.288 Or, we may confront a case 
where the crime is serious, but the sanction is too severe and there is little 
equitable flexibility in the law. Here, there are benefits to slack in the system but 
also reasons to want increased enforcement, and the framework may not tell us 
how to proceed. 
Third, the framework may yield problematic incentives in the long run. 
Slack may be valuable in the current moment but may have negative effects 
over time, for example, by allowing bad laws to stay on the books unnoticed 
because they are not being enforced.289 These dynamics may raise rule-of-law 
concerns. 
Fourth, it is difficult to prevent cross-uses of data, so implementing the 
framework may not be feasible in practice. As we have noted, data legitimately 
obtained and processed for one purpose may later be put to different uses in a 
way that is hard to constrain.290 Such repurposing and reuse may be a result of 
legitimate as well as illegitimate transfers (e.g., leaks, hacks, and theft). A broader 
concern is that policymakers’ desire to punish crimes or guarantee public safety 
will drive ever more comprehensive data collection, and that data will inevitably 
be used for an increasingly broad range of purposes.291 
Fifth, some may prioritize countervailing values (e.g., privacy, intellectual 
flourishing, and preservation of community values) and thus value slack even 
more than our framework does. For some, a highly efficient legal system in 
which the government has 100% transparent information about everyone and 
is able to use that information is fundamentally disturbing, even if such uses are 
perfectly and optimally attenuated.292 Deontological-leaning arguments that 
prioritize slack despite potentially adverse outcomes are regularly made in the 
context of surveillance and national security.293 Similar intuitions are reflected 
elsewhere in the law, for example, in Fourth Amendment protections against 
 
288.  See, e.g., Lohr, supra note 257. 
289.  See Price, supra note 17. 
290.  See sources cited supra note 176. 
291.  See generally sources cited supra note 78; Martin, supra note 193 (discussing how data used for one 
purpose gets appropriated for another); see also Amy Dockser Marcus, Customers Handed Over Their DNA. The 
Company Let the FBI Take a Look, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 22, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/customers-
handed-over-their-dna-the-company-let-the-fbi-take-a-look-11566491162. 
292.  See Richards, supra note 2. 
293.  See, e.g., id. 
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unreasonable searches and seizures that are grounded in the view that important 
values must be weighed against improved enforcement.294 
Finally, and related to the point above, some may worry about the changing 
relationship between government and society if law’s design changes 
dynamically to reflect changes in slack and data. For example, some might view 
ex ante nudges as unduly paternalistic and may resist their use, even if increased 
data permits it.295 
These complicating factors suggest that while abstract principles are easy 
to articulate, reality is far messier. In practice, policymakers may have to choose 
between erring on the side of collecting, processing, and using data despite 
potentially problematic consequences and refraining from doing so despite the 
potential benefits. These decisions will often have to be made without complete 
information. As articulated in Part I.C, our view is that there remain compelling 
arguments in favor of preserving some slack in the legal system. As noted, 
though, our position does invite counterarguments, as slack holds clear risks. 
The case for preserving slack therefore represents a classic uneasy case. 
In short, the policy approach we advance is a messy one: apply the basic 
four-part framework but with a clear appreciation for the complexifying factors 
and with a tilt in the direction of adopting data policies that protect slack where 
appropriate. 
B. Concrete Policy for the Data Age 
We now discuss three concrete policy approaches that can be taken to 
safeguard slack: (1) greater aggregate constraints on collection and storage of 
data, (2) policies that rely on data silos and the architecture of information to 
prevent inappropriate cross-uses, and (3) measures that attenuate data’s 
negative impacts, including reform of legal rules such as statutes of limitations 
and penalties and fundamental rethinking of the role of government with 
respect to compliance and enforcement. Our analysis concentrates on the 
safeguarding of slack, rather than explicating how data can be used more 
effectively, in recognition of the fact that the contemporary trend is already in 
the direction of ever-increasing data usage. Thus, the important policy edge is 
the one that looks at constraints on such uses. 
Two important caveats: First, we do not attempt to identify an ideal mix of 
interventions. Rather, our goal is simply to delineate potential responses. 
Second, some of our proposals map on to reforms that others have advanced 
 
294.  See, e.g., Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 767–70 (2012) (noting 
tradeoff built into exclusionary rules if we assume officers care about securing convictions); see also sources 
cited supra note 22. 
295.  See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY NUDGE?: THE POLITICS OF LIBERTARIAN PATERNALISM 128 
(2014). 
OEI & RING_EIC REVIEW (DO NOT DELETE) 11/15/2021  11:33 AM 
2021] “Slack” in the Data Age 95 
to manage privacy risks.296 Our concerns and proposed solutions overlap with, 
but are not identical to, those raised by privacy scholars. Our argument is that 
in addition to constitutional and deontological concerns about privacy and its 
loss, data raises serious questions about how law is designed and enforced by 
imperfect government against the imperfect governed. These questions run 
parallel to privacy debates but are not the primary focus of the privacy literature. 
In fact, our view is that a better appreciation of the relationships among data, 
data privacy, and slack illuminates the consequentialist underbelly of even 
deontological privacy debates. 
1. Limiting Data Collection and Storage 
Preserving slack requires limiting data collection and accumulation.297 
Private sector actors of all kinds (companies, social media platforms, 
commercial actors) already collect vast quantities of data, and our current legal 
framework seems largely powerless to stop this.298 Governments, too, collect 
extensive data through their enforcement, regulatory, and oversight functions, 
including through border-control, policing, licensing, registration, permitting, 
tax, and social security systems.299 Governments have strong incentives to 
improve and expand data collection to enhance security, enforcement, and 
efficiency, particularly in competition with the private sector and particularly in 
times of crisis (such as a public health or national security emergency).300 In 
crisis times, the public may be least resistant to a government data grab.301 
Given the already pervasive data collection by private and public sector 
actors, a strategy that focuses on limiting collection and storage may seem 
doomed to fail. But some limits remain possible. Regulation can circumscribe 
what can be collected and stored, by either establishing upfront limitations on 
collection, terminating collection, or demanding erasure at a certain point. One 
strategy that has been explored is to use default rules that make data collection 
an opt-in.302 Defaults that preserve privacy unless waived are likely to be more 
 
296.  See sources cited infra notes 311–312 and accompanying text. 
297.  The types of data and privacy interventions we consider go beyond “right to erasure” concerns 
animating European Union initiatives such as the “right to be forgotten.” Directive 95/46, art. 12, 1995 O.J. 
(L 281) 31 (EC); Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 (EU). 
298.  See Angelique Carson, Data Privacy Laws: What You Need to Know in 2021, OSANO (July 20, 2021), 
https://www.osano.com/articles/data-privacy-laws. 
299.  See generally Eleni Kosta & Magda Brewczynska, Government Access to User Data: Towards More 
Meaningful Transparency Reports, (Tilburg Inst. L., Tech., & Soc., Law & Tech. Working Paper Series, 2019) 
(discussing businesses’ roles in providing transparency regarding government access to privately held data). 
300.  Tiffany C. Li, Privacy in Pandemic: Law, Technology, and Public Health in the COVID-19 Crisis, 52 LOY. 
U. CHI. L. REV. 767 (2021); see sources cited supra note 172. 
301.  See, e.g., Li, supra note 300, at 789. 
302.  Cf. California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100 (2020) (allowing 
consumers to opt out). 
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effective than disclosure-based solutions such as website cookie notifications 
that require the user to understand and affirmatively opt out.303 
Serious challenges have accompanied efforts to develop more 
comprehensive regulation of government data collection. The trend in the 
European Union304 towards more protection for individuals’ data has not taken 
hold in the United States. Domestic agendas and concerns, such as the pressure 
to tighten U.S. borders,305 favor increasing government access. Moreover, data-
collection efforts of foreign governments and entities may be beyond the reach 
of U.S. regulation. Foreign governments, agencies, and bodies have sought to 
amass data on other countries’ citizens, residents, corporations, and 
governments on matters of finance, politics, military security, and more.306 For 
example, the February 2018 Department of Justice indictment of Russian 
individuals working with the Internet Research Agency in St. Petersburg details 
the alleged use of stolen identities of U.S. persons to post to social media 
accounts, open financial accounts, and create false identification documents.307 
Russia-based actors have also used false Facebook accounts to extract 
information from U.S. business owners.308 Such foreign interventions do not 
directly dictate the level of data-related powers a country should permit for its 
own government, but they do create a potential imbalance in data access 
between domestic and foreign actors, which could ultimately constrain impulses 
to limit data collection. 
2. Data Architecture and Data Silos 
Given the difficulties with limiting overall data collection, another approach 
is to construct data silos that constrain the uses—and particularly, the cross-
uses—of data after its collection. As we have discussed, examples such as the 
use of state driver’s license databases and commercially purchased databases for 
federal immigration purposes vividly illustrate how data collected by one set of 
actors can be sold and used by another.309 They also show how multiple data 
 
303.  See, e.g., Franz Werro, The Right to Inform v. The Right to be Forgotten, in LIABILITY IN THE THIRD 
MILLENNIUM 285 (Ciacchi et al. eds., 2009). 
304.  See, e.g., sources cited supra note 297. 
305.  See sources cited supra note 181. 
306.  See, e.g., Indictment, United States v. Zhiyong, No. 2:30 CR 046 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 28, 2020) (charging 
four members of the Chinese military with hacking Equifax computers and obtaining the names, birthdates, 
and social security numbers of 145 million Americans). 
307.  Indictment ¶¶ 4, 41, 70, 89, United States v. Internet Research Agency LLC, 1:18-cr-00032-DLF 
(D.D.C. Feb. 16, 2018). 
308.  Shelby Holliday & Rob Barry, Russian Influence Campaign Extracted Americans’ Personal Data, WALL 
ST. J. (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/russian-influence-campaign-extracted-americans-
personal-data-1520418600. 
309.  See Harwell, supra note 234. 
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sources are increasingly easy to combine, generating unforeseen insights and 
unexpected consequences.310 
As we have argued, slack may be more or less justifiable depending on 
context. Thus, a legal regime capable of controlling data flows and transfers 
based on context is a plausible solution. For example, explicit rules that permit 
governments to request data for serious crimes but limit access for less serious 
violations could be enacted. Restrictions on information access by those trying 
to enforce unjust laws may also be necessary. This siloing might be 
accomplished through restrictions on data transfers by private sector actors or 
limits on governments’ ability to request and buy data or both.311 Along these 
lines, Professors Jack Balkin and Jonathan Zittrain have suggested an 
“information fiduciaries” framework for considering how companies like 
Google and Facebook should be held responsible for how they collect, use, sell, 
and share data.312 
The idea of siloing data to constrain problematic cross-uses predates the 
data age. The tax system, for example, has historically exercised tight controls 
on tax return data; a court order is required to compel the IRS to share tax 
return information with law enforcement agencies for investigation and 
prosecution of nontax criminal laws.313 Similar restrictions could be put in place 
that restrict governments’ ability to use data collected for one purpose for 
another, that constrain governments from obtaining data from private actors, 
or that restrict how such data, if obtained, may be used.314 
Constructing data silos requires line drawing, which is challenging. 
Calibrating data access based on the formal level of the crime—such as felony 
versus misdemeanor status—may raise questions at the boundaries but does 
not seem unduly burdensome. More challenging would be drawing lines 
between laws that are unjust or out of step and those that are not, or 
 
310.  See, e.g., Zraick & Zaveri, supra note 181; Funk, supra note 171; Tau & Hackman, supra note 235. 
311.  Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1183, 1194–
96 (2016) (distinguishing collection, use, disclosure, and sale of information). 
312.  Id. at 1186, 1205–09 (proposing that online service providers and cloud companies be viewed as 
information fiduciaries towards customers and users); Jack M. Balkin, The Fiduciary Model of Privacy, 134 HARV. 
L. REV. F. 11, 13–29 (2020); Jack M. Balkin & Jonathan Zittrain, A Grand Bargain to Make Tech Companies 
Trustworthy, ATLANTIC (Oct. 3, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/10/information-fiduciary/502346/ (proposing 
information fiduciaries framework); Jonathan Zittrain, How to Exercise the Power You Didn’t Ask For, HARV. 
BUS. REV. (Sept. 19, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/09/how-to-exercise-the-power-you-didnt-ask-for; see also 
Tim Wu, An American Alternative to Europe’s Privacy Law, N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/30/opinion/europe-america-privacy-gdpr.html; Neil Richards & 
Woodrow Hartzog, A Duty of Loyalty for Privacy Law, 99 WASH. UNIV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript 
at 20-22); Daniel J. Solove, The Myth of the Privacy Paradox, 89 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) 
(manuscript at 33–49), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3536265#. 
313.  26 U.S.C. § 6103(i)(1). 
314.  For a “takings clause”-inspired approach to curtailing government access to internet service 
provider data, see Michael C. Pollack, Taking Data, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 77 (2019). 
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determining which governments or agencies should be denied access to data.315 
In addition, institutional questions regarding where authority for data-use 
decisions should rest must be resolved. Vesting such authority in courts is one 
possibility, but the judicial system moves slowly. Another possibility is to vest 
authority to protect data and curb abuses in an independent agency, an auditor 
within an existing agency, or another ombudsperson. 
Moreover, there are possible objections to data silos. First, a tightly 
controlled data spigot may smell like information dictatorship, in which 
governments not only collect and control data but also set the terms under 
which the data can be used. Those who advocate an “information wants to be 
free” position might be skeptical of a data-silo approach.316 Second, the fact 
that a business or government possesses data and is constrained from using it 
but can continue to monitor and surveil data subjects has impacts reaching far 
beyond actual liability for misconduct. The mere threat of potential future data 
use operates as a form of social control. Third, construction of data silos may 
simply be unrealistic due to data’s nonrival nature and the corresponding 
pressure to allow markets for data to exist. Fourth, data silos may face regular 
illegal breaches if information exists but is not made available to resolve certain 
violations. Fifth, data silos may incentivize governments to put more effort into 
accumulating their own data troves if they find themselves shut out from 
obtaining data from others. 
Ultimately, a silo-based approach runs counter to broader trends toward 
fuller transparency and disclosure. In the international tax context, for example, 
the trend has recently shifted to permitting broader use of taxpayer information 
and more widespread information exchange.317 Implementation of such silos 
would require a clear shift. 
 
315.  We have seen these complex pressures in the international tax context when determining how to 
limit the exchange of tax data with jurisdictions that have corruption or rule-of-law issues and with those that 
might not adequately protect exchanged data. See Irma Mosquera Valderrama, Exchange of Information and the 
Rule of Law: Confidentiality and Safeguards for the Automatic Processing of Data in a World of Big Data, GLOBTAXGOV 
(Jan. 12, 2020), https://globtaxgov.weblog.leidenuniv.nl/2020/12/01/exchange-of-information-and-the-
rule-of-law-confidentiality-and-safeguards-for-the-automatic-processing-of-data-in-a-world-of-big-data. One 
solution has been peer reviews of countries regarding compliance with data protection standards. See Global 
Forum on Transparency and Disclosure of Information for Tax Purposes, ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/about-the-global-forum/publications/revised-methodology.pdf. 
316.  See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 129. 
317.  See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., ARTICLES OF THE MODEL CONVENTION WITH 
RESPECT TO TAXES ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL 23 (2003), 
https://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/1914467.pdf (furnishing an exchange of information treaty provision 
that serves as the basis for many bilateral treaties). Data use is now permitted if the laws of both treaty partners 
allow it and if authorized by the information-supplying state. Id. The OECD has also recently made efforts 
to enlarge countries’ access to taxpayer data outside of the bilateral treaty context. See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. 
COOP. & DEV., ACTION 13: COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY REPORTING: AUTOMATIC EXCHANGE OF 
INFORMATION 9-13 (2015), https://www.oecd.org/ctp/transfer-pricing/beps-action-13-country-by-
country-reporting-implementation-package.pdf. 
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3. Broader Strategies 
Aside from data protections and siloing, the data age requires recalibration 
and redesign of substantive legal rules. This obviously affects the content and 
structure of legal regimes and sanctions. Even more fundamentally, though, it 
requires rethinking of the relationship between government and the governed. 
Redesign of technical rules and a broader reimagining of the role of government 
vis-à-vis the governed can help temper the effects of government overreach. As 
data grows more ubiquitous, enforcement-based interactions with government 
are likely to increase disproportionately for those who are least sophisticated 
and already most targeted. Recalibrating legal rules and reimagining government 
can help modulate the costs and burdens of these interactions. 
a. Recalibrating Underlying Law 
Two obvious possible adjustments to legal rules pertain to penalties and 
statutes of limitations. Another involves explicit protections for populations 
most likely to be prejudiced by decreasing slack due to data. 
Design of Penalties. Where existing law relies on high fines and stiff penalties 
to achieve deterrence when the likelihood of detection is low, these penalties 
should arguably be revisited if detection becomes significantly easier after data. 
With easier detection, the in terrorem effect of high penalties is no longer 
needed.318 Thus, from both an economically optimal viewpoint and a fairness 
one, penalties should be reduced. Take the dog registration example discussed 
above.319 If, with data, it becomes easy for authorities to reliably and accurately 
detect all dogs in the city and their owners, then arguably the $5,000 fine should 
be lowered. Or, take the 2010 FATCA tax legislation discussed above, which 
imposed heightened penalties for foreign financial asset reporting failures.320 
FATCA penalties should perhaps be lessened now that foreign financial 
information is easily available given information sharing. Similar arguments 
apply in other areas of law and regulation.321 Of course, policymakers should 
avoid the flipside risks, where overly low penalties convert penalties into a 
“price” that actors may simply choose to pay rather than comply.322 
 
318.  See Lana Friesen, Certainty of Punishment versus Severity of Punishment: An Experimental Investigation, 79 
S. ECON. J. 399, 399–402 (2012). 
319.  See supra Part II.B.6. 
320.  See supra notes 259–263 and accompanying text. 
321.  See, e.g., LAWS. COMM. FOR CIV. RTS. OF THE S.F. BAY AREA, PAYING MORE FOR BEING POOR 
3, 9–19 (2017), https://www.lccr.com/wp-content/uploads/LCCR-Report-Paying-More-for-Being-Poor-
May-2017.pdf (assessing disproportionate impacts of excessively high traffic fines and costs on the poor). 
322.  See, e.g., Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, The Second Day-Care Center Study, ARIEL RUBINSTEIN (Sept. 
2005), http://arielrubinstein.tau.ac.il/papers/WC05/GR1.pdf; Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a 
Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2000); Michael N. Stagnaro, Antonio A. Arechar & David G. Rand, From Good 
Institutions to Generous Citizens: Top-Down Incentives to Cooperate Promote Subsequent Prosociality But Not Norm 
Enforcement, COGNITION (Oct. 2017), 
OEI & RING_EIC REVIEW (DO NOT DELETE) 11/15/2021  11:33 AM 
100 ALABAMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:1:47 
Statutes of Limitation. As available data expands, more attention should also 
be paid to statutes of limitations for detection and sanctions. Some statutes of 
limitation reflect the reality that governments may need time to uncover 
evidence required to enforce or prosecute.323 A risk, however, is that as data 
becomes ubiquitous and indefinitely storable, government authorities may sit 
on data, take their time to process it, and then, years down the road, impose 
sanctions as a “gotcha.” An appropriate organizing concept for designing 
statutes of limitations in the data age might be something along the lines of a 
“right to timely use of one’s data,” especially in situations where it is not obvious 
to the data subject that they violated the law.324 Current law already captures 
this sentiment in some cases where, for example, certain crimes involving high 
degrees of harm (such as murder) do not have a statute of limitations but others 
do.325 
Well-designed statutes of limitation give enforcers an incentive to act on 
increasingly available data in a reasonably diligent way. Returning again to the 
tax example: current tax law contains extended statutes of limitations for cross-
border income and financial asset reporting omissions on the theory that 
information about foreign assets is hard for governments to obtain.326 As 
offshore data troves become increasingly available, however, extended 
limitations periods have become less necessary and the attendant benefits may 
no longer outweigh the risks.327 
Decisions to tweak statutes of limitation may have unintended 
consequences. If limitations periods are shorter, this may generate even more 
pressure to collect and use data and to develop greater capacity to mine and 
process data into useable information, which may raise even greater privacy 
concerns. A key question going forward is whether a well-designed, middle-
ground policy can be reached. 
Protection of Vulnerable Populations. Finally, some populations may be 
sufficiently at risk that we should consider giving them special data protections. 
Children, young adults, digital migrants, and the elderly may each experience 
particular vulnerabilities. For example, children may have their images widely 
and publicly posted by parents, with surveillance consequences that are just now 
 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5875418/pdf/nihms864083.pdf; Kristen Underhill, 
When Extrinsic Incentives Displace Intrinsic Motivation: Designing Legal Carrots and Sticks to Confront the Challenge of 
Motivational Crowding-Out, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 213, 218-32 (2016). 
323.  For example, in tax law, some foreign asset reporting violations carry lengthy statutes of 
limitation. 26 U.S.C. §§ 6501(e)(1)(A)(ii), 6501(c)(8)(A). 
324.  See Scott Turow, Opinion, Still Guilty After All These Years, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2007), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/08/opinion/08turow.html. 
325.  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3281 (no statute of limitations under federal law for capital offenses); see 
CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL 31253, STATUTE OF LIMITATION IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES: 
AN OVERVIEW, 1–2 (2017). 
326.  See, e.g., sources cited supra note 323. 
327.  See Lindsey Powell, Unraveling Criminal Statutes of Limitations, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 115, 128–35 
(2008). 
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becoming salient.328 Digital migrants and the elderly may be less cognizant 
about how to safeguard data and the risks of sharing it and may be more 
susceptible to data theft.329 While educating individuals about the risks of data 
sharing is important, education-based interventions are unlikely to be sufficient 
by themselves. 
Given that vulnerable populations are likely to bear the disproportionate 
brunt of the expanding use of data for law enforcement and regulation, it is 
reasonable to think that law should be tailored to accommodate such 
vulnerabilities. The criminal law system already incorporates some of these 
ideas in its management of juvenile criminal records.330 But going forward, the 
issues will be much broader and some of the solutions less obvious. In some 
cases, the relevant data may be in the hands of the private sector, and uses may 
span a wide range of legal, professional, and social contexts. At that point, a 
regime more comprehensive than simply sealing juvenile records would be 
required. 
b. Rethinking Noncompliance and the Role of Government 
Perhaps most fundamentally, ubiquitous data demands a deeper shift in 
how we understand the meaning of enforcement, compliance, and the 
relationship between government and governed. 
Changing Meanings of Noncompliance. The social and expressive meaning of 
noncompliance is changing in the data age. One effect of increasingly 
omnipresent data is that humans have more information about their actions and 
can self-monitor more effectively. However, while data may improve human 
conduct and propel better decision-making, perfect conduct and 100% 
compliance remain unlikely.331 In a society with many laws, we can expect that 
humans will still regularly violate the law. For example, humans will continue 
to speed, may forget to pay speeding tickets, or may continue to make errors in 
their tax returns. 
We do not attempt a deep explanation of why humans comply imperfectly. 
Our point is that if humans are failing at perfection even with the knowledge 
that data is available and enforcement increasingly likely, this probably signals 
that at least some offenders may not be deliberately “trying to get away with it” 
 
328.  See, e.g., Kashmir Hill & Aaron Krolik, How Photos of Your Kids are Powering Surveillance Technology, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/10/11/technology/flickr-facial-
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329.  See, e.g., Steven Petrow, You’re Sharing Your Cell Phone Number Too Frequently, USA TODAY (June 
20, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/columnist/stevenpetrow/2017/06/20/cell-phone-
number-scams-identity-theft/102787432/. 
330.  See Joy Radice, The Juvenile Record Myth, 106 GEO. L.J. 365, 374 (2018). 
331. See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Loftus & Hunter G. Hoffman, Misinformation and Memory: The Creation of New 
Memories, 118 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH.: GEN. 100 (1989); Ganapathi Bhat Manchi et al., Study on Cognitive 
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but rather are failing due to inattention, inability to cope, bounded rationality, 
processing capability, or some other human imperfection.332 If so, then one 
might argue, as other scholars have, that compliance failures that continue to 
occur after a data and information explosion carry a different meaning and 
should give rise to different legal consequences.333 This may suggest adjusting 
the levels of seriousness ascribed to certain offenses after data, for example, 
regarding them as infractions or misdemeanors rather than something more 
serious. 
Government as Compliance Coordinator. Along the same lines, it may make more 
sense in a world of burgeoning data to have government act as ex ante 
compliance coordinator rather than ex post punisher in at least some contexts. 
As a compliance coordinator, the government’s priority would shift toward 
using increasingly available data and information to affirmatively help people to 
comply with the law, rather than using information primarily as part of the ex 
post enforcement toolkit. A compliance coordinator approach suggests 
redesigning systems to make compliance easier paired with reasonable fines for 
noncompliance. Returning to the dog registration example,334 we could have 
the city automatically register dogs and pair this with an easily accessible avenue 
for residents to appeal mistakes. This approach would arguably make more 
sense than placing the obligation on each dog owner to self-register and 
punishing failure with an ex post fine. Alternatively, the duty to register could 
remain with the dog owner, but the locality could have an accurate and fast 
system of corroboration, with failure to register treated as a foot fault given the 
virtual certainty of detection. In the tax context, more robust tax withholding 
and third-party reporting of independent contractor payments could reduce 
income reporting or estimated tax payment failures.335 Such government-
facilitated automation of income reporting and tax payment could increase 
compliance and decrease the ex post enforcement role of tax authorities. 
Our suggested move towards a “compliance coordinator” understanding 
of government is not wholly new. Threads of this instinct run through various 
policy proposals. For example, this reasoning underpins proposals like Casey 
and Niblett’s call for personalized “microdirectives” that can replace traditional 
legal rules and standards,336 as well as arguments recommending that structures 
and technologies be designed to make violation of the law impossible.337 In tax 
law, the so-called “ready return”—a tax return prepared by the government for 
 
332.  See, e.g., HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY (1982). 
333.  See, e.g., Brownsword & Harel, supra note 282, at 111; R.A. Duff, Perversions and Subversions of 
Criminal Law, in THE BOUNDARIES OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, 88, 88–112 (R.A. Duff et al. eds., 2010) (noting 
change in regulatory signal). 
334.  See supra Part II.B.6. 
335.  See, e.g., Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, Taxing the Gig Economy, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1415, 1473 (2018) 
(suggesting non-employee tax withholding). 
336.  See sources cited supra note 276. 
337.  Rademacher, supra note 25. 
OEI & RING_EIC REVIEW (DO NOT DELETE) 11/15/2021  11:33 AM 
2021] “Slack” in the Data Age 103 
the taxpayer, which the taxpayer then reviews and submits—is floated as an 
example of how the government could use information ex ante to help taxpayers 
comply, rather than amassing data as a weapon to punish ex post.338 Other 
countries, including the U.K. and Sweden, already employ a ready-return 
approach to varying degrees.339 While the prospect of a government-prepared 
tax return has critics, it is an obvious example of how governments’ role might 
change in light of data and technology. 
A compliance coordinator frame may also suggest amendments to existing 
laws. Returning to FATCA tax reporting340 of foreign financial assets, a 
compliance coordinator approach might envision that once information about 
offshore financial assets is available and reliable, the government should either 
assume primary responsibility for preparing the return or should help taxpayers 
prepare an accurate return (for example, by giving taxpayers a copy of the 
information reported to it by offshore banks). Moreover, the government 
should treat errors that continue to be made after data becomes widely available 
as good-faith foot faults rather than assuming bad intent.341 Currently, the law 
continues to impose high penalties for omissions despite the government’s 
possession of the information.342 
An Important Role for Sunshine. A compliance coordinator approach does 
pose risks. It may weaken deterrence and allow those who can afford to do so 
to violate the law and simply pay a fine.343 Shifts to ex ante coordination and 
monitoring rather than ex post sanctioning might also raise even more privacy 
concerns. Some might find it disturbing for the government to spy on our dogs 
and prepare our tax returns and give us microdirectives. A second-order 
concern is that once law starts to be designed this way, it may serve as an excuse 
for governments to become data monsters, amassing more and more data in 
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the interests of coordinating compliance.344 Finally, a move to ex ante 
coordination (particularly if assisted by technology) may lead to erosion of 
moral instincts and community moral aspirations.345 
All this suggests that sunshine and transparency will be important in 
mediating the changing relationship between governments and the governed 
post data. As discussed, we are skeptical that sunshine alone will be enough to 
prevent problematic outcomes, but it may nonetheless help ameliorate 
enforcement disparities and other problems.346 Sunshine may take the form of 
disclosure to data subjects regarding the collection and use of their data. Or, it 
may take the form of disclosure to the general public about data use, which can 
generate press coverage to help curb problematic enforcement or to foment 
outrage in its wake. We have already seen ways in which sunshine has been used 
to promote government accountability. One example that has gathered 
momentum in recent years is the use of police body cameras.347 Although not 
a precise parallel, such cameras collect extensive data on police–public 
interactions and can be available to those seeking to assess potential bias.348 
Requirements that police maintain statistics on traffic stops also allow observers 
to monitor for bias.349 
In some circumstances, there may be valid reasons for limiting sunshine. In 
tax law, for example, preserving the effectiveness of IRS audit strategies may 
require keeping reasons for audit decisions secret.350 But other alternatives 
could offer meaningful oversight, whether through independent auditors or 
procedures for contesting decisions. Tax law has balanced the need for secrecy 
with the need for accountability by instituting the Office of the National 
Taxpayer Advocate, an independent ombudsperson charged with protecting 
taxpayer rights.351 The creation of the Taxpayer Advocate was motivated in part 
by the difficulty of checking potential IRS abuses while simultaneously 
safeguarding its enforcement capabilities.352 By creating an independent 
accountability auditor, the Taxpayer Advocate option arguably affords a 
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compromise between complete government secrecy and complete transparency 
to the public.353 
In establishing an independent ombudsperson or avenues for recourse, 
policymakers should be careful that inequities are not perpetuated. Less 
sophisticated or lesser resourced demographics may be less likely to appeal 
decisions or turn to an ombudsperson or other procedural recourse.354 In 
addition, some types of data-related complaints might prove easier to resolve 
than others. For example, it may be relatively easy to appeal a harsh penalty on 
the grounds that ten other similarly situated persons have been given a lighter 
penalty. But it may be harder to show that someone else has been unfairly let 
off the hook while one has been punished. The second species of legal challenge 
requires uncovering specific incidents and facts, which may require 
whistleblowing and due diligence reviews. Ultimately, stronger legal rules 
facilitating such whistleblowing and diligence may be needed. 
CONCLUSION 
The data age is upon us, and increasingly ubiquitous data threatens the 
existence of slack, the informal latitude to fall short of law’s requirements 
without being held accountable. There are significant risks that use of data is 
causing slack to contract unfairly for some populations more than others. This 
Article has argued that slack in our legal system derives from multiple sources 
and is sometimes deeply problematic but nonetheless serves an important 
function. 
A critical conundrum facing our legal system going forward is whether it is 
possible to use and deploy data effectively while preserving slack where 
appropriate and allocating it fairly. Solving this conundrum is especially 
challenging given that laws are heterogeneous and that data is both nonrival and 
hard to effectively silo. This Article has articulated a framework for managing 
the slack-data relationship, and it has outlined policy solutions for managing 
data’s effects, including limits on data collection and storage, use of data silos 
to constrain access and use, and fundamental recalibration of legal rules and the 
government–governed relationship. 
The solutions we have offered are not perfect. They may bump up against 
the First Amendment and “right to be informed” concerns,355 may be deemed 
unfeasible in light of competitive pressures from foreign powers, or may clash 
with law enforcement and crime prevention goals. These are tensions that will 
have to be managed going forward. Data is already pervasive, and more is 
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coming. Failure to acknowledge data’s power in shaping real-world 
enforcement and in reshaping the availability of slack in the system will 
predictably burden the most disadvantaged members of society. The design 
choices we make today, including inaction, will have significant distributional 
and expressive consequences. 
 
